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Abstract
RATIONALITY AND EFFICIENT VERIFIABLE COMPUTATION
by
MATTEO CAMPANELLI
Advisor: Professor Rosario Gennaro
In this thesis, we study protocols for delegating computation in a model where one of the parties
is rational. In our model, a delegator outsources the computation of a function f on input x to a
worker, who receives a (possibly monetary) reward. Our goal is to design very efficient delegation
schemes where a worker is economically incentivized to provide the correct result f(x). In this
work we strive for not relying on cryptographic assumptions, in particular our results do not require
the existence of one-way functions.
We provide several results within the framework of rational proofs introduced by Azar and Mi-
cali (STOC 2012). We make several contributions to efficient rational proofs for general feasible
computations. First, we design schemes with a sublinear verifier with low round and communica-
tion complexity for space-bounded computations. Second, we provide evidence, as lower bounds,
against the existence of rational proofs: with logarithmic communication and polylogarithmic ver-
ification for P and with polylogarithmic communication for NP.
We then move to study the case where a delegator outsources multiple inputs. First, we for-
malize an extended notion of rational proofs for this scenario (sequential composability) and we
show that existing schemes do not satisfy it. We show how these protocols incentivize workers to
provide many “fast” incorrect answers which allow them to solve more problems and collect more
rewards. We then design a d-rounds rational proof for sufficiently “regular” arithmetic circuit of
depth d = O(log n) with sublinear verification. We show, that under certain cost assumptions, our
scheme is sequentially composable, i.e. it can be used to delegate multiple inputs. We finally show
vthat our scheme for space-bounded computations is also sequentially composable under certain
cost assumptions.
In the last part of this thesis we initiate the study of Fine Grained Secure Computation: i.e. the
construction of secure computation primitives against “moderately complex” adversaries. Such
fine-grained protocols can be used to obtain sequentially composable rational proofs. We present
definitions and constructions for compact Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Verifiable Com-
putation secure against (non-uniform) NC1 adversaries. Our results hold under a widely believed
separation assumption, namely NC1 ( ⊕L/poly. We also present two application scenarios for
our model: (i) hardware chips that prove their own correctness, and (ii) protocols against rational
adversaries potentially relevant to the Verifier’s Dilemma in smart-contracts transactions such as
Ethereum.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
The problem of efficiently checking the correctness of a computation performed by an un-
trusted party has been central in Complexity Theory for the last 30 years since the introduction of
Interactive Proofs by Babai and Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [6, 29].
Verifiable Outsourced Computation is now a very active research area in Cryptography and
Network Security (see [53] for a survey) with the aim to design protocols where it is impossible
(under suitable cryptographic assumptions) for a provider to “cheat” in the above scenarios. While
much progress has been done in this area, we are still far from solutions that can be deployed in
practice.
Part of the reason is that Cryptographers consider a very strong adversarial model that prevents
any adversary from cheating. A different approach is to restrict ourselves to rational adversaries,
whose motivation is not just to disrupt the protocol or computation, but simply to maximize a well
defined utility function (e.g. profit).
A different approach is to consider a model where “cheating” might actually be possible, but the
provider would have no motivation to do so. In other words while cryptographic protocols prevent
any adversary from cheating, one considers protocols that work against rational adversaries whose
motivation is to maximize a well defined utility function.
We investigate this approach through two theoretical “lenses”: (i) rational proofs, a variant of
interactive proofs where provers lose (in economic terms) whenever they attempt to “prove” a false
statement; (ii) fine-grained protocols, a model where parties’s resources are assumed to be limited
1 and cheating is possible only through a larger amount of resources (e.g., cheating requires time
λ3, for some parameter λ, but all participating parties are assumed to be able to run in time at most
λ2). The connections between rationality and the latter model will be explored in the subsequent
sections and in Appendix A.
1In a more specific sense than the usual “probabilistic polynomial time”.
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1.1 Rational Proofs
In the first two part of this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) we use the concept of Rational Proofs
introduced by Azar and Micali in [4] and refined in a subsequent paper [5].
In a Rational Proof, given a function f and an input x, the server returns the value y = f(x),
and (possibly) some auxiliary information, to the client. The client will in turn pay the server for
its work with a reward which is a function of the messages sent by the server and some randomness
chosen by the client. The crucial property is that this reward is maximized in expectation when the
server returns the correct value y. Clearly a rational prover who is only interested in maximizing
his reward, will always answer correctly.
The most striking feature of Rational Proofs is their simplicity. For example in [4], Azar and
Micali show single-message Rational Proofs for any problem in #P , where an (exponential-
time) prover convinces a (poly-time) verifier of the number of satisfying assignment of a Boolean
formula.
For the case of “real-life” computations, where the Prover is polynomial and the Verifier is as
efficient as possible, Azar and Micali in [5] show d-round Rational Proofs for functions computed
by (uniform) Boolean circuits of depth d, for d = O(log n) (which can be collapsed to a single
round under some well-defined computational assumption as shown in [31]). The problem of
rational proofs for any polynomial-time computable function remains tantalizingly open.
Recent work [32] shows how to obtain Rational Proofs with sublinear verifiers for languages in
NC. Recalling that L ⊆ NL ⊆ NC2, one can use the protocol in [32] to verify a logspace polytime
computation (deterministic or nondeterministic) in O(log2 n) rounds and O(log2 n) verification.
The work by Chen et al. [15] focuses on rational proofs with multiple provers and the related
class MRIP of languages decidable by a polynomial verifier interacting with an arbitrary number
of provers. Under standard complexity assumptions, MRIP includes languages not decidable by a
verifier interacting only with one prover. The class MRIP is equivalent to EXP||NP.
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1.1.1 Contributions for Rational Proofs
Expressivity.
We present new protocols for the verification of space-bounded polytime computations against a
rational adversary. More specifically, consider a language L ∈ DTISP(T (n), S(n)), i.e. recog-
nized by a deterministic Turing Machine ML which runs in time T (n) and space S(n). In Section
2.3 we construct a protocol where a rational prover can convince the verifier that x ∈ L or x /∈ L
with the following properties:
• The verifier runs in time O(S(n) log n)
• The protocol has O(log n) rounds and communication complexity O(S(n) log n)
• The prover simply runs ML(x)
For the case of “real-life” computations (i.e. poly-time computations verified by a “super-
efficient” verifier) we note that for computations in sublinear space our general results yields a
protocol in which the verifier is sublinear-time. Our protocols is the first rational proof for SC (also
known as DTISP(poly(n), polylog(n))) with polylogarithmic verification and logarithmic rounds.
To compare this with the results in [32], we note that it is believed that NC 6= SC and that
the two classes are actually incomparable (see [19] for a discussion). For these computations our
results compare favorably to the one in [32] in at least one aspect: our protocol requires O(log n)
rounds and has the same verification complexity.
We present several extensions of our main result:
• Our main protocol can be extended to the case of space-bounded randomized computations
using Nisan’s pseudo-random generator [47] to derandomize the computation.
• We also present a different protocol that works for BPNC (bounded error randomized NC)
where the Verifier runs in polylog time (note that this class is not covered by our result since
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we do not know how to express NC with a polylog-space computation). This protocol uses
in a crucial way a new composition theorem for rational proofs presented in this work and
can be of independent interest.
• Finally, we present lower bounds (i.e. conditional impossibility results) for Rational Proofs
for various complexity classes.
Repeated Executions and Costly Computation.
Motivated by the problem of volunteer computation, our first result is to show that the definition of
Rational Proofs in [4, 5] does not satisfy a basic compositional property which would make them
applicable in that scenario. Consider the case where a large number of ”computation problems”
are outsourced. Assume that solving each problem takes time T . Then in a time interval of length
T , the honest prover can only solve and receive the reward for a single problem. On the other
hand a dishonest prover, can answer up to T problems, for example by answering at random, a
strategy that takes O(1) time. To assure that answering correctly is a rational strategy, we need that
at the end of the T -time interval the reward of the honest prover be larger than the reward of the
dishonest one. But this is not necessarily the case: for some of the protocols in [4, 5, 31] we can
show that a “fast” incorrect answer is more remunerable for the prover, by allowing him to solve
more problems and collect more rewards.
The next questions, therefore, was to come up with a definition and a protocol that achieves
rationality both in the stand-alone case, and in the composition described above. We first present
an enhanced definition of Rational Proofs that removes the economic incentive for the strategy of
fast incorrect answers, and then we present a protocol that achieves it for the case of some (uni-
form) bounded-depth circuits. Next, we design a d-rounds rational proof for sufficiently “regular”
arithmetic circuit of depth d = O(log n) with sublinear verification. We show, that under certain
cost assumptions, our scheme is sequentially composable, i.e. it can be used to delegate multiple
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inputs. We finally show that our scheme for space-bounded computations from Section 2.3 is also
sequentially composable under certain cost assumptions.
1.1.2 Comparison with Other Prior Work
OTHER DECISION-THEORETIC FRAMEWORKS. An earlier work in the line of “rational verifi-
able computation” is [8] where the authors describe a system based on a scheme of rewards [resp.
penalties] that the client assesses to the server for computing the function correctly [resp. incor-
rectly]. However in this system checking the computation may require re-executing it, something
that the client does only on a randomized subset of cases, hoping that the penalty is sufficient to
incentivize the server to perform honestly. Morever the scheme might require an ”infinite” budget
for the rewards, and has no way to ”enforce” payment of penalties from cheating servers. For these
reasons the best application scenario of this approach is the incentivization of volunteer computing
schemes (such as SETI@Home or Folding@Home), where the rewards are non-fungible ”points”
used for ”social-status”.
Because verification is performed by re-executing the computation, in this approach the client
is ”efficient” (i.e. does ”less” work than the server) only in an amortized sense, where the cost
of the subset of executions verified by the client is offset by the total number of computations
performed by the server. This implies that the server must perform many executions for the client.
INTERACTIVE PROOFS. Obviously a “traditional” interactive proof (where security holds
against any adversary, even a computationally unbounded one) would work in our model. In
this case the most relevant result is the recent independent work in [50] that presents breakthrough
protocols for the deterministic (and randomized) restriction of the class of language we consider.
If L is a language which is recognized by a deterministic (or randomized) Turing Machine ML
which runs in time T (n) and space S(n), then their protocol has the following properties:
• The verifier runs in O(poly(S(n)) + n · polylog(n)) time;
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• The prover runs in polynomial time;
• The protocol runs in constant rounds, with communication complexity O(poly(S(n)nδ) for
a constant δ.
Apart from round complexity (which is the impressive breakthrough of the result in [50]) our
protocols fares better in all other categories. Note in particular that a sublinear space computation
does not necessarily yield a sublinear-time verifier in [50]. On the other hand, we stress that our
protocol only considers weaker rational adversaries.
COMPUTATIONAL ARGUMENTS. There is a large class of protocols for arguments of correctness
(e.g. [23, 24, 40]) even in the rational model [31, 32]. Recall that in an argument, security is
achieved only against computationally bounded prover. In this case even single round solutions
can be achieved. We will consider a variant of this model in Chapter 4.
COMPUTATIONAL DECISION THEORY. Other works in theoretical computer science have studied
the connections between cost of computation and utility in decision problems. The work in [34]
proposes a framework for computational decision problems, where the Decision Maker’s (DM)
utility depends on the algorithm chosen for computing its strategy. The Decision Maker runs the
algorithm, assumed to be a Turing Machine, on the input to the computational decision problem.
The output of the algorithm determines the DM’s strategy. Thus the choice of the DM reduces to
the choice of a Turing Machine from a certain space. The DM will have beliefs on the running
time (cost) of each Turing machine. The actual cost of running the chosen TM will affect the
DM’s reward. Rational proofs with costly computation could be formalized in the language of
computational decision problems in [34]. There are similarities between the approach in this work
and that in [34], as both take into account the cost of computation in a decision problem.
1.1.3 Future Directions
Our work leaves open a series of questions:
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• What is the relationship between scoring rule based protocols vs weak interactive proofs?
Our work seems to indicate that the latter technique is more powerful (our work shows an
example of a class of language which is not known to be recognizable using scoring rules
and that scoring rules seem inherently insecure in a composable setting). Is it possible to
show, however, that a scoring-rule based protocol can be transformed into a weak interactive
proof (without a substantial loss of efficiency) therefore showing that it is enough to focus
on the latter?
• Can we build efficient rational proofs for arbitrary poly-time computations, where the verifier
runs in sub-linear, or even in linear, time? Even in the standalone model of [4]?
• Our proof of sequential composability considers only non-adaptive adversaries, and enforces
this condition by the use of timing assumptions or computationally bounded provers. Is it
possible to construct protocols that are secure against adaptive adversaries? Or is it possi-
ble to relax the timing assumption to something less stringent than what is required in our
protocol?
• It would be interesting to investigate the connection between the model of Rational Proofs
and the work on Computational Decision Theory in [34]. In particular it would be inter-
esting to look at realistic cost models that could affect the choice of strategy by the prover
particularly in the sequentially composable model.
1.2 Fine-Grained Verifiable Computation
One of the crucial developments in Modern Cryptography has been the adoption of a more “fine-
grained” notion of computational hardness and security. The traditional cryptographic approach
modeled computational tasks as “easy” (for the honest parties to perform) and “hard” (infeasible
for the adversary). Yet we have also seen a notion of moderately hard problems being used to attain
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 9
certain security properties. The best example of this approach might be the use of moderately hard
inversion problems used in blockchain protocols such as Bitcoin. Although present in many works
since the inception of Modern Cryptography, this approach was first formalized in a work of Dwork
and Naor [21].
In the second part of this thesis (Chapter 4) we consider the following model (which can be
traced back to the seminal paper by Merkle [46] on public key cryptography). Honest parties will
run a protocol which will cost2 them C while an adversary who wants to compromise the security
of the protocol will incur a C ′ = ω(C) cost. Note that while C ′ is asymptotically larger than C, it
might still be a feasible cost to incur – the only guarantee is that it is substantially larger than the
work of the honest parties. For example in Merkle’s original proposal for public-key cryptography
the honest parties can exchange a key in time T but the adversary can only learn the key in time T 2.
Other examples include primitives introduced by Cachin and Maurer [11] and Hastad [35] where
the cost is the space and parallel time complexity of the parties, respectively.
Recently there has been renewed interest in this model. Degwekar et al. [20] show how to con-
struct certain cryptographic primitives in NC1 [resp. AC0] which are secure against all adversaries
in NC1 [resp. AC0]. In conceptually related work Ball et al. [7] present computational problems
which are “moderately hard” on average, if they are moderately hard in the worst case, a useful
property for such problems to be used as cryptographic primitives.
The goal of this work is to initiate a study of Fine Grained Secure Computation. The question
we ask is if it is possible to construct secure computation primitives that are secure against “mod-
erately complex” adversaries. We answer this question in the affirmative, by presenting definitions
and constructions for the task of Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Verifiable Computation in
the fine-grained model. We also present two application scenarios for our model: i) hardware chips
that prove their own correctness and ii) protocols against rational adversaries including potential
2 We intentionally refer to it as “cost” to keep the notion generic. For concreteness one can think of C as the
running time required to run the protocol.
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solutions to the Verifier’s Dilemma in smart-contracts transactions such as Ethereum.
Rationality and Fine-Grained Secure Computation.
In Chapter 3 we studied “sequentially composable” rational protocols, i.e. protocols where the
reward is strictly connected, not just to the correctness of the result, but to the amount of work
done by the prover. Our work on Fine-Grained Secure Computation complements those results,
which only apply to a limited class of computations. In fact, a protocol secure in a fine-grained
sense is also a sequentially composable rational proof: consider for example a protocol where the
prover collects the reward only if he produces a proof of correctness of the result. Assume that the
cost to produce a valid proof for an incorrect result, is higher than just computing the correct result
and the correct proof. Then obviously a rational prover will always answer correctly, because the
above strategy of fast incorrect answers will not work anymore.
1.2.1 Contributions for Fine-Grained Secure Computation
Our starting point is the work in [20] and specifically their public-key encryption scheme secure
against NC1 circuits. Recall that AC0[2] is the class of Boolean circuits with constant depth, un-
bounded fan-in, augmented with parity gates. If the number of AND gates of non constant fan-in
is constant we say that the circuit belongs to the class AC0Q[2] ⊂ AC0[2].
Our results can be summarized as follows
• We first show that the techniques in [20] can be used to build a somewhat homomorphic
encryption (SHE) scheme. We note that because honest parties are limited to NC1 compu-
tations, the best we can hope is to have a scheme that is homomorphic for computations in
NC1. However our scheme can only support computations that can be expressed in AC0Q[2].
• We then use our SHE scheme, in conjunction with protocols described in [23, 16, 2], to
construct verifiable computation protocols for functions in AC0Q[2], secure and input/output
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 11
private against any adversary in NC1.
Our somewhat homomorphic encryption also allows us to obtain the following protocols secure
against NC1 adversaries: (i) constant-round 2PC, secure in the presence of semi-honest static ad-
versaries for functions in AC0Q[2]; (ii) Private Function Evaluation in a two party setting for cir-
cuits of constant multiplicative depth without relying on universal circuits. These results stem from
well-known folklore transformations and we do not prove them formally.
The class AC0Q[2] includes many natural and interesting problems such as: fixed precision arith-
metic, evaluation of formulas in 3CNF (or kCNF for any constant k), a representative subset of
SQL queries, and S-Boxes [9] for symmetric key encryption.
Our results (like [20]) hold under the assumption that NC1 ( ⊕L/poly, a widely believed
worst-case assumption on separation of complexity classes. Notice that this assumption does not
imply the existence of one-way functions (or even P 6= NP). Thus, our work shows that it is
possible to obtain “advanced” cryptographic schemes, such as somewhat homomorphic encryption
and verifiable computation, even if we do not live in Minicrypt34.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER APPROACHES. One important question is: on what features are our
schemes better than “generic” cryptographic schemes that after all are secure against any polyno-
mial time adversary.
One such feature is the type of assumption one must make to prove security. As we said above,
our schemes rely on a very mild worst-case complexity assumption, while cryptographic SHE and
VC schemes rely on very specific assumptions, which are much stronger than the above.
For the case of Verifiable Computation, we also have information-theoretic protocols which are
secure against any (possibly computationally unbounded) adversary. For example the “Muggles”
protocol in [28] which can compute any (log-space uniform) NC function, and is also reasonably
efficient in practice [18]. Or, the more recent work [27], which obtains efficient VC for functions
3This is a reference to Impagliazzo’s “five possible worlds” [36].
4Naturally the security guarantees of these schemes are more limited compared to their standard definitions.
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in a subset of NC ∩ SC. Compared to these results, one aspect in which our protocol fares better is
that our Prover/Verifier can be implemented with a constant-depth circuit (in particular in AC0[2],
see Section 4.3) which is not possible for the Prover/Verifier in [28, 27], which needs to be in TC05.
Moreover our protocol is non-interactive (while [28, 27] requires Ω(1) rounds of interaction) and
because our protocols work in the “pre-processing model” we do not require any uniformity or
regularity condition on the circuit being outsourced (which are required by [28] and [18]). Finally,
out verification scheme achieves input and output privacy.
Finally, we compare our results with the information-theoretic approaches (mostly based on
randomized encodings) in [30, 37, 1, 52]. From the techniques in these works one could ob-
tain somewhat homomorphic encryption and verifiable computation in low-depth circuits (even
in NC0). Here, however, we stress that we are interested in compact homomorphic encryption
schemes (where the ciphertexts do not grow in size with each homomorphic operation) and in ver-
ifiable computation schemes where the total work of the verifier approximately linear in the I/O
size (i.e. the size of the verification circuit should be O(poly(λ)(n + m)) where n and m are the
size of the input and output respectively). The techniques in these works cannot directly achieve
these goals. In fact, for homomorphic encryption, they lead to ciphertexts of size exponential in d,
where d is the depth of the (fan-in two) evaluation circuit. For verifiable computation, they lead to
verification with quadratic running time6.
1.2.2 Technical Highlights
In [20] the authors already point out that their scheme is linearly homomorphic. We make use of
the re-linearization technique from [10] to construct a leveled homomorphic encryption.
5The techniques in [28, 27] are based on properties of finite fields. Arithmetic in such fields can be carried out by
threshold circuits of constant depth, but not in AC0[2].
6On why this running time: in a straightforward application of these approaches we would have the verifier com-
puting the (randomized) encoding of a function f ∈ NC1. The work necessary for this is quadratic in the size of the
branching program computing f [37] (this is cubic if we use the approach in [30], described in Guy Rothblum’s thesis
[51]).
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Our scheme (as the one in [20]) is secure against adversaries in the class of (non-uniform)
NC1. This implies that we can only evaluate functions in NC1 otherwise the evaluator would
be able to break the semantic security of the scheme. However we have to ensure that the whole
homomorphic evaluation stays in NC1. The problem is that homomorphically evaluating a function
f might increase the depth of the computation.
In terms of circuit depth, the main overhead will be (as usual) the computation of multiplication
gates. As we show in Section 4.2 a single homomorphic multiplication can be performed by a
depth two AC0[2] circuit, but this requires depth O(log(n)) with a circuit of fan-in two. Therefore,
a circuit for f with ω(1) multiplicative depth would require an evaluation of ω(log(n)) depth,
which would be out of NC1. Therefore our first scheme can only evaluate functions with constant
multiplicative depth, as in that case the evaluation stays in AC0[2].
We then present a second scheme that extends the class of computable functions to AC0Q[2] by
allowing for a negligible error in the correctness of the scheme. We use techniques from a work by
Razborov [49] on approximating AC0[2] circuits with low-degree polynomials – the correctness of
the approximation (appropriately amplified) will be the correctness of our scheme.
1.2.3 Application Scenarios
The applications described in this section refer to the problem of Verifying Computation, where a
Client outsources an algorithm f and an input x to a Server, who returns a value y and a proof that
y = f(x). The security property is that it should be infeasible to convince the verifier to accept
y′ 6= f(x), and the crucial efficiency property is that verifying the proof should cost less than
computing f (since avoiding that cost was the reason the Client hired the Server to compute f ).
HARDWARE CHIPS THAT PROVE THEIR OWN CORRECTNESS Verifiable Computation (VC) can
be used to verify the execution of hardware chips designed by untrusted manufacturers. One could
envision chips that provide (efficient) proofs of their correctness for every input-output computa-
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tion they perform. These proofs must be efficiently verified in less time and energy than it takes to
re-execute the computation itself.
When working in hardware, however, one may not need the full power of cryptographic protec-
tion against any malicious attacks since one could bound the computational power of the malicious
chip. The bound could be obtained by making (reasonable and evidence-based) assumptions on
how much computational power can fit in a given chip area. For example one could safely assume
that a malicious chip can perform at most a constant factor more work than the original function
because of the basic physics of the size and power constraints. In other words, if C is the cost of
the honest Server in a VC protocol, then in this model the adversary is limited to O(C)-cost com-
putations, and therefore a protocol that guarantees that succesful cheating strategies require ω(C)
cost, will suffice. This is exactly the model in our paper. Our results will apply to the case in which
we define the cost as the depth (i.e. the parallel time complexity) of the computation implemented
in the chip.
THE VERIFIER’S DILEMMA. In blockchain systems such as Ethereum, transactions can be ex-
pressed by arbitrary programs. To add a transaction to a block miners have to verify its validity,
which could be too costly if the program is too complex. This creates the so-called Verifier’s
Dilemma [43]: given a costly valid transaction Tr a miner who spends time verifying it is at a
disadvantage over a miner who does not verify it and accept it “uncritically” since the latter will
produce a valid block faster and claim the reward. On the other hand if the transaction is in-
valid, accepting it without verifying it first will lead to the rejection of the entire block by the
blockchain and a waste of work by the uncritical miner. The solution is to require efficiently ver-
ifiable proofs of validity for transactions, an approach already pursued by various startups in the
Ethereum ecosystem (e.g. TrueBit7). We note that it suffices for these proofs to satisfy the condi-
tion above: i.e. we do not need the full power of information-theoretic or cryptographic security
but it is enough to guarantee that to produce a proof of correctness for a false transaction is more
7TrueBit: https://truebit.io/
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costly than producing a valid transaction and its correct proof, which is exactly the model we are
proposing.
1.2.4 Future Directions
Our work opens up many interesting future directions.
First of all, it would be nice to extend our results to the case where cost is the actual running
time, rather than “parallel running time”/“circuit depth” as in our model. The techniques in [7]
(which presents problems conjectured to have Ω(n2) complexity on the average), if not even the
original work of Merkle [46], might be useful in building a verifiable computation scheme where
if computing the function takes time T , then producing a false proof of correctness would have to
take Ω(T 2).
For the specifics of our constructions it would be nice to “close the gap” between what we can
achieve and the complexity assumption: our schemes can only compute AC0Q[2] against adversaries
in NC1, and ideally we would like to be able to compute all of NC1 (or at the very least all of
AC0[2]).
Finally, to apply these schemes in practice it is important to have tight concrete security reduc-
tions and a proof-of-concept implementations.
1.3 Notation and Common Preliminaries
For a distribution D, we denote by x ← D the fact that x is being sampled according to D. We
remind the reader that an ensemble X = {Xλ}λ∈N is a family of probability distributions over a
family of domains D = {Dλ}λ∈N. We say two ensembles D = {Dλ}λ∈N and D′ = {D′λ}λ∈N are
statistically indistinguishable if 1
2
∑
x |D(x)−D′(x)| < neg(λ).
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1.4 Thesis Roadmap
This thesis combines research done in several works. Chapter 2 contains results on rational proofs
for subclasses of polynomial-time computations in the model of Azar and Micali [4]. Chapter 3
contains a critique of the original model of raitonal proofs, definitions for sequential composabil-
ity and related results. The results of these two chapters are joint work with Rosario Gennaro,
originally presented in [14] and [12] (notice that each of the two chapters do not correspond to
each of the two works). Chapter 4 contains results on homomorphic encryptions and delegating
computation in a fine-grained model where adversaries are NC1 circuits. The results in this chapter
are joint work with Rosario Gennaro, originally presented in [13].
Chapter 2
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2.1 The Landscape of Rational Proof Systems
Rational Proof systems can be divided in roughly two categories, both of them presented in the
original work [4].
SCORING RULES. The more “novel” approach in [4] uses scoring rules to compute the reward
paid by the verifier to the prover. A scoring rule is used to asses the “quality” of a prediction of a
randomized process. Assume that the prover declares that a certain random variable X follows a
particular probability distribution D. The verifier runs an “experiment” (i.e. samples the random
variable in question) and computes a “reward” based on the distributionD announced by the prover
and the result of the experiment. A scoring rule is maximized if the prover announced the real
distribution followed by X . The novel aspect of many of the protocols in [4] was how to cast the
computation of y = f(x) as the announcement of a certain distribution D that could be tested
efficiently by the verifier and rewarded by a scoring rule.
A simple example is the protocol for #P in [4] (or its “scaled-down” version for Hamming
weight described more in detail in Section 2.2). Given a Boolean formula Φ(x1, . . . , xn) the prover
announces the numberm of satisfying assignments. This can be interpreted as the prover announc-
ing that if one chooses an assignment at random it will be a satisfying one with probability m ·2−n.
The verifier then chooses a random assignment and checks if it satisfies Φ or not and uses m and
the result of the test to compute the reward via a scoring rule. Since the scoring rule is maximized
by the announcement of the correct m, a rational prover will announce the correct value.
As pointed out in [14] the problem with the scoring rule approach is that the reward declines
slowly as the distribution announced by the Prover becomes more and more distant from the real
one. The consequence is that incorrect results still get a substantial reward, even if not a maximal
one. Since those incorrect results can be computed faster than the correct one, a Prover with
“budget” B might be incentivized to produce many incorrect answers instead of a single correct
one. All of the scoring rule based protocols in [4, 5, 31, 32] suffer from this problem.
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WEAK INTERACTIVE PROOFS. The definition of rational proofs requires that the expected reward
is maximized for the honest prover. This definition can be made stronger (as done explicitly in
[31]) and require a that every systematically dishonest prover would incur a polynomial loss (this
property is usually described in terms of a noticeable reward gap). As discussed above, the elegant
device of scoring rules is the basis for most rational proof protocols in literature, some of which
achieve noticeable reward gap. Another simple way in which we can obtain this stronger type of
rational proof is the following. Imagine having a test where the prover can be caught cheating with
“low”, but non-negligible probability, e.g. n−k for some k ∈ N. We will informally call this test a
weak interactive proof 1. Indeed for such proofs we can always pay a fixed reward R to the prover
unless we catch him cheating in which case we pay 0. These are rational proofs since obviously
the expected reward of the prover is maximized by the honest behavior. Some of the proofs in [4]
and the proofs in [14] are weak interactive proofs. Those proofs also turn out to be secure in the
sequential model of [14] (under appropriate assumptions).
The protocols in this work are weak interactive proof, which is why we can prove them to be
sequentially composable2.
SCORING RULES VS. WEAK INTERACTIVE PROOFS. Comparing approaches based on scoring
rules and weak interactive proofs the following two questions come up:
• Does one approach systematically lead to more efficient rational proofs (in terms of rounds,
communication and verifying complexity) than the other?
• Is one approach more suitable for sequential composability than the other?
We do not have a precise answer to the above questions, which we believe are interesting open
problems to consider. However we can make the following statements.
1This is basically the covert adversary model for multiparty computation introduced in [3].
2 One exception is the protocol for BPNC, which depends on the underlying protocol for (deterministic) NC. If
we use the one in [32], then the resulting protocol uses scoring rules and is not sequentially composable. However an
alterative protocol for NC can be used, based on our work in [14], which is a weak interactive proof and can be proven
sequentially composable.
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Regarding the first question: in the context of “stand-alone” (non sequential) rational proofs it
is not clear which approach is more powerful. We know that for every language class known to
admit a scoring rule based protocol we also have a weak interactive proof with similar performance
metrics (i.e. number of rounds, verifier efficiency, etc.). The result in this paper is the first example
of a language class for which we have rational proofs based on weak interactive proofs but no
example of a scoring rule based protocol exist3. This suggests that the weak interactive proof
approach might be the more powerful technique. It would be interesting to prove that all rational
proofs are indeed weak interactive proofs: i.e. that given a rational proof with certain efficiency
parameters, one can construct a weak interactive proof with “approximately” the same parameters.
This question is left as future work.
On the issue of sequential composability, we have already proven in [14] that some rational
proofs based on scoring rules (such as Brier’s scoring rule) are not sequentially composable. This
problem might be inherent at least for scoring rules that pay a substantial reward to incorrect
computations. What we can say is that all known sequentially composable proofs are based on
weak interactive proofs ([14], [5]4 and this work). Again it would be interesting to prove that this
is required, i.e. that all sequentially composable rational proofs are weak interactive proofs.
2.2 Definitions and Preliminaries
The following is the definition of Rational Proof from [4]. As usual with neg(·) we denote a
negligible function, i.e. one that is asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any polynomial.
Conversely a noticeable function is the inverse of a polynomial.
Definition 2.2.1 (Rational Proof). A function f : {0, 1}n→ {0, 1}∗ admits a rational proof if there
3 We stress that in this comparison we are interested in protocols with similar efficiency parameters. For example,
the work in [4] presents several large complexity classes for which we have rational proofs. However, these protocols
require a polynomial verifier and do not obtain a noticeable reward gap.
4The construction in Theorem 5.1 in [5] is shown to be sequentially composable in [14].
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exists an interactive proof (P, V ) and a randomized reward function rew : {0, 1}∗ → R≥0 such
that
1. For any input x ∈ {0, 1}n, Pr[out((P, V )(x)) = f(x)] ≥ 1− neg(n).
2. For every prover P˜ , and for any input x ∈ {0, 1}n there exists a δP˜ (x) ≥ 0 such that
E[rew((P˜ , V )(x))] + δP˜ (x) ≤ E[rew((P, V )(x))].
The expectations and the probabilities are taken over the random coins of the prover and verifier.
We note that differently than [4] we allow for non-perfect completeness: a negligible probabil-
ity that even the correct prover will prove the wrong result. This will be necessary for our protocols
for randomized computations.
Let P˜ = Pr[out((P, V )(x)) 6= f(x)]. Following [31] we define the reward gap as
∆(x) = minP ∗:P∗=1[δP ∗(x)]
i.e. the minimum reward gap over the provers that always report the incorrect value. It is easy to
see that for arbitrary prover P˜ we have δP˜ (x) ≥ P˜ · ∆(x). Therefore it suffices to prove that a
protocol has a strictly positive reward gap ∆(x) for all x.
Definition 2.2.2 ([4, 5, 31]). The class DRMA[r, c, T ] (Decisional Rational Merlin Arthur) is the
class of boolean functions f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} admitting a rational proof Π = (P, V, rew) s.t. on
input x:
• Π terminates in r(|x|) rounds;
• The communication complexity of P is c(|x|);
• The running time of V is T (|x|);
• The function rew is bounded by a polynomial;
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• Π has noticeable reward gap.
Remark 1. The requirement that the reward gap must be noticeable was introduced in [5, 31] and
is explained in Section 3.5.
EXAMPLES OF RATIONAL PROOFS. For concreteness here we show the protocol for a single
threshold gate (readers are referred to [4, 5, 31] for more examples).
Let Gn,k(x1, . . . , xn) be a threshold gate with n Boolean inputs, that evaluates to 1 if at least
k of the input bits are 1. The protocol in [5] to evaluate this gate goes as follows. The Prover an-
nounces the number m˜ of input bits equal to 1, which allows the Verifier to computeGn,k(x1, . . . , xn).
The Verifier select a random index i ∈ [1..n] and looks at input bit b = xi and rewards the Prover
using Brier’s Rule BSR(p˜, b) where p˜ = m˜/n i.e. the probability claimed by the Prover that a
randomly selected input bit be 1. Then
BSR(p˜, 1) = 2p˜− p˜2 − (1− p˜)2 + 1 = 2p˜(2− p˜)
BSR(p˜, 0) = 2(1− p˜)− p˜2 − (1− p˜)2 + 1 = 2(1− p˜2)
Let m be the true number of input bits equal to 1, and p = m/n the corresponding probability,
then the expected reward of the Prover is
pBSR(p˜, 1) + (1− p)BSR(p˜, 0) (2.1)
which is easily seen to be maximized for p = p˜ i.e. when the Prover announces the correct
result. Moreover one can see that when the Prover announces a wrong m˜ his reward goes down by
2(p − p˜)2 ≥ 2/n2. In other words for all n-bit input x, we have ∆(x) = 2/n2 and if a dishonest
Prover P˜ cheats with probability P˜ then δP˜ > 2P˜/n
2.
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2.3 Rational Proofs for Space-Bounded Computations
We are now ready to present our protocol. It uses the notion of a Turing Machine configuration,
i.e. the complete description of the current state of the computation: for a machine M , its state,
the position of its heads, the non-blank values on its tapes.
Let L ∈ DTISP(T (n), S(n)) and M be the deterministic TM that recognizes L. On input x, let
γ1, . . . , γN (where N = T (|x|)) be the configurations that M goes through during the computation
on input x, where γi+1 is reached from γi according to the transition function of M . Note, first of
all, that each configuration has size O(S(n)). Also if x ∈ L (resp. x /∈ L) then γN is an accepting
(resp. rejecting) configuration.
The protocol presented below is a more general version of the one used in [14] and described
above. The prover shows the claimed final configuration γˆN and then prover and verifier engage in
a ”chasing game”, where the prover ”commits” at each step to an intermediate configuration. If the
prover is cheating (i.e. γˆN is wrong) then the intermediate configuration either does not follow from
the initial configuration or does not lead to the final claimed configuration. At each step and after
P communicates the intermediate configuration γ′, the verifier then randomly chooses whether to
continue invoking the protocol on the left or the right of γ′. The protocol terminates when V ends
up on two previously declared adjacent configurations that he can check. Intuitively, the protocol
works since, if γˆN is wrong, for any possible sequence of the prover’s messages, there is at least
one choice of random coins that allows V to detect it; the space of such choices is polynomial in
size.
We assume that V has oracle access to the input x. What follows is a formal description of the
protocol.
1. P sends to V :
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• γN , the final accepting configuration (the starting configuration, γ1, is known to the
verifier);
• N , the number of steps between the two configurations.
2. Then V invokes the procedure PathCheck(N, γ1, γN).
The procedure PathCheck(m, γl, γr) is defined for 1 ≤ m ≤ N as follows:
• If m > 1, then:
1. P sends intermediate configurations γp and γq (which may coincide) where p =
b l+m−1
2
c and q = d l+m−1
2
e.
2. If p 6= q, V checks whether there is a transition leading from configuration γp to
configuration γq. If yes, V accepts; otherwise V halts and rejects.
3. V generates a random bit b ∈R {0, 1}
4. If b = 0 then the protocol continues invoking PathCheck(bm
2
c, γl, γp); If b = 1 the
protocol continues invoking PathCheck(bm
2
c, γq, γr)
• If m = 1, then V checks whether there is a transition leading from configuration γl to
configuration γr. If l = 1, V checks that γl is indeed the initial configuration γ1. If
r = N , V checks that γr is indeed the final configuration sent by P at the beginning. If
yes, V accepts; otherwise V rejects.
Theorem 2.3.1. DTISP[poly(n), S(n)] ⊆ DRMA[O(log n), O(S(n) log n), O(S(n) log n)]
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Proof. Let us consider the efficiency of the protocol above. It requires O(log n) rounds. Since
the computation is in DTISP[poly(n), S(n)], the configurations P sends to V at each round have
size O(S(n)). The verifier only needs to read the configurations and, at the last round, check
the existence of a transition leading from γl to γr. Therefore the total running time for V is
O(S(n) log n).
Let us now prove that this is a rational proof with noticeable reward gap. Observe that the
protocol has perfect completeness. Let us now prove that the soundness is at most 1 − 2− logN =
1− 1
O(poly(n))
. We aim at proving that, if there is no path between the configurations γ1 and γN then
V rejects with probability at least 2− logN . Assume, for sake of simplicity, that N = 2k for some
k. We will proceed by induction on k. If k = 1, P provides the only intermediate configuration
γ′ between γ1 and γN . At this point V flips a coin and the protocol will terminate after testing
whether there exists a transition between γ1 and γ′ or between γ′ and γN . Since we assume the
input is not in the language, there exists at most one of such transitions and V will detect this with
probability 1/2.
Now assume k > 1. At the first step of the protocol P provides an intermediate configuration
γ′. Either there is no path between γ1 and γ′ or there is no path between γ′ and γN . Say it is the
former: the protocol will proceed on the left with probability 1/2 and then V will detect P cheating
with probability 2−k+1 by induction hypothesis, which concludes the proof.
The theorem above implies the results below.
Corollary 2.3.2. L ⊆ DRMA[O(log n), O(log2 n), O(log2 n)]
This improves over the construction of rational proofs for L in [32] due to the better round
complexity.
Corollary 2.3.3. SC ⊆ DRMA[O(log n), O(polylog(n)), O(polylog(n))]
No known result was known for SC before.
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2.3.1 Rational Proofs for Randomized Bounded Space Computation
We now describe a variation of the above protocol, for the case of randomized bounded space
computations.
Let BPTISP[t, s] denote the class of languages recognized by randomized machines using time
t and space swith error bounded by 1/3 on both sides. In other words, L ∈ BPTISP[poly(n), S(n)]
if there exists a (deterministic) Turing MachineM such that for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗ Prr∈R{0,1}ρ(|x|) [M(x, r) =
L(x)] ≥ 2
3
and that runs in S(|x|) space and polynomial time. Let ρ(n) be the maximum number
of random bits used by M for input x ∈ {0, 1}n; ρ(·) is clearly polynomial.
We can bring down the 2/3 probability error to neg(n) by constructing a machine M ′. M ′
would simulate the M on x iterating the simulation m = poly(|x|) times using fresh random bits at
each execution and taking the majority output of M(x; ·). The machine M ′ uses mρ(|x|) random
bits and runs in polynomial time and S(|x|) +O(log(n)) space.
The work in [47] introduces pseudo-random generators (PRG) resistant against space bounded
adversaries. An implication of this result is that any randomized Turing Machine M1 running in
time T and space S can be simulated by a randomized Turing Machine M2 running in time O(T ),
space O(S log(T )) and using only O(S log(T )) random bits5 (see in particular Theorem 3 in [47]).
Let L ∈ BPTISP[(poly(n), S(n)] and M ′ defined as above. We denote by Mˆ the simulation of M ′
that uses Nisan’s result described above.
By using the properties of the new machine Mˆ , we can directly construct rational proofs for
BPTISP(poly(n), S(n)). We let the verifier picks a random string r (of length O(S log(T ))) and
sends it to the prover. They then invoke a rational proof for the computation Mˆ(x; r).
By the observations above and Theorem 2.3.1 we have the following result:
Corollary 2.3.4. BPTISP[poly(n), S(n)] ⊆ DRMA[log(n), S(n) log2(n), S(n) log2(n)]
We note that for this protocol, we need to allow for non-perfect completeness in the definition
5We point out that the new machine M2 introduces a small error. For our specific case this error keeps the overall
error probability negligible and we can ignore it.
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of DRMA in order to allow for the probability that the verifier chooses a bad random string r.
2.4 A Composition Theorem for Rational Proofs
In this Section we prove a relatively simple composition theorem that states that while proving the
value of a function f , we can replace oracle access to a function g, with a rational proof for g.
The technically interesting part of the proof is to make sure that the total reward of the prover is
maximized when the result of the computation of f is correct. In other words, while we know
that lying in the computation of g will not be a rational strategy for just that computation, it may
turn out to be the best strategy as it might increase the reward of an incorrect computation of f . A
similar issue (arising in a particular rational proof for depth d circuits) was discussed in [5]: our
proof generalizes their technique.
Definition 2.4.1. We say that a rational proof (P, V, rew) for f is a g-oracle rational proof if V has
oracle access to the function g and carries out at most one oracle query. We allow the function g to
depend on the specific input x.
Theorem 2.4.2. Assume there exists a g-oracle rational proof (P of , V of , rewof ) for f with notice-
able reward gap and with round, communication and verification complexity respectively rf , cf
and Tf . Let tI the time necessary to invoke the oracle for g and to read its output.Assume there
exists a rational proof (Pg, Vg, rewg) with noticeable reward gap for g with round, communication
and verification complexity respectively rg, cg and Tg. Then there exists a (non g-oracle) rational
proof with noticeable reward gap for f with round, communication and verification complexity
respectively rf + 1 + rg, cf + tI + cg and Tf − ti + Tg.
Before we embark on the proof of Theorem 2.4.2, we prove a technical Lemma. The definition
of rational proof requires that the expected reward of the honest prover is not lower than the ex-
pected reward of any other prover. The following intuitive lemma states we necessarily obtain this
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property if an honest prover has a polynomial expected gain in comparison to provers that always
provide a wrong output.
Lemma 2.4.3. Let (P, V ) be a protocol and rew a reward function as in Definition 2.2.1. Let f be
a function s.t. ∀xPr[out(P, V )(x)] = 1. Let ∆ be the corresponding reward gap w.r.t. the honest
prover P and f . If ∆ > 1
poly
then (P, V, rew) is a rational proof for f and admits noticeable reward
gap.
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g that for all P ′ 6= P and such that ∀xPr[out(P ′, V )(x)] = 1 it holds that
E[rew(P, V )(x)] ≥ E[rew(P ′, V )(x)].
Fix x. Let P˜ be an arbitrary prover,R = E[rew(P, V )(x)], y˜ = out(P˜ , V )(x), R˜ = E[rew(P˜ , V )(x)],
R˜corr = E[rew(P˜ , V )(x)|y˜ = f(x)], R˜err = E[rew(P˜ , V )(x)|y˜ 6= f(x)]. Then:
R− R˜ = (2.2)
R− Pr[y˜ = f(x)]R˜corr − Pr[y˜ 6= f(x)] = (2.3)
Pr[y˜ = f(x)](R− R˜corr) + Pr[y˜ 6= f(x)](R− R˜err) ≥ (2.4)
Pr[y˜ 6= f(x)](R− R˜err) ≥ (2.5)
Pr[y˜ 6= f(x)]∆ > (2.6)
0 (2.7)
The inequality above shows that (P, V, rew) is a rational proof for f . By the hypothesis on ∆
this protocol already admits a noticeable reward gap.
The proof of Theorem 2.4.2 follows.
Proof. Let rewof and rewg be the reward functions of the g-oracle rational proof for f and the
rational proof for g respectively. We now construct a new verifier V for f . This verifier runs
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exactly like the g-oracle verifier for f except that every oracle query to g is now replaced with an
invocation of the rational proof for g. The new reward function rew is defined as follows:
rew(T ) = δrewof (T of ◦ yg) + rewg(Tg)
where T is the complete transcript of the new rational proof, T of is the transcript of the oracle
rational proof for f , Tg and yg are respectively the transcript and the output of the rational proof
for g. Finally δ is multiplicative factor in (0, 1]). The intuition behind this formula is to ”discount”
the part of the reward from f so that the prover is incentivized to provide the true answer for g. In
turn, since rewof rewards the honest prover more when the verifier has the right answer for a query
to g (by hypothesis), this entails that the whole protocol is rational proof for f .
To prove the theorem we will use Lemma 2.4.3 and it will suffice to prove that the new protocol
has a noticeable reward gap.
Consider a prover P˜ that always answer incorrectly on the output of f . Let pg be the probability
that the prover outputs a correct yg. Then the difference between the expected reward of the honest
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prover and P˜ is:
δ(Rof − R˜of ) + (Rg − R˜g) = (2.1)
δ(Rof − pgR˜o,good(g)f − (1− pg)R˜o,wrong(g)f )+
(Rg − pgR˜good(g)g − (1− pg)R˜wrong(g)g ) = (2.2)
δ(pg(R
o
f − R˜o,good(g)f ) + (1− pg)(Rf − R˜o,wrong(g)f ))
+pg(Rg − R˜good(g)g ) + (1− pg)(Rg − R˜wrong(g)g ) > (2.3)
δ(pg∆
o
f + (1− pg)(−bof (n))) + 0 + (1− pg)∆g = (2.4)
pgδ∆
o
f + (1− pg)(∆g − δbof (n)) ≥ (2.5)
min{δ∆of ,∆g − δbof (n)} > (2.6)
1
poly
(2.7)
Where the last inequality holds for δ = ∆g
2bof (n)
.
The round, communication and verification complexity of the construction is given by the sum
of the respective complexities from the two rational proofs modulo minor adjustments. These
adjustments account for the additional round by which the verifier communicates to the prover the
requested instance for g.
The theorem above can be used as design tool of rational proofs for a function f : first build a
rational proof assuming the verifier has oracle access to a function g, then build a rational proof for
g. This automatically provides a complete rational proof for f .
Remark 2. Theorem 2.4.2 assumes that verifier in the oracle rational proof for f carries out a
single oracle query. Notice however that the proof of the theorem can be generalized to any verifier
carrying out a constant number of adaptive oracle queries, possibly all for distinct functions. This
can be done by iteratively applying the theorem to a sequence of m = O(1) oracle rational proofs
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for functions f1, ..., fm where the i-th rational proof is fi+1-oracle for 1 ≤ i < m.
2.4.1 Rational Proofs for Randomized Circuits
As an application of the composition theorem described above we present an alternative approach
to rational proofs for randomized computations. We show that by assuming the existence of a com-
mon reference string (CRS) we obtain rational proofs for randomized circuits of polylogarithmic
depth and polynomial size, i.e. BPNC the class of uniform polylog-depth poly-size randomized
circuits with error bounded by 1/3 on both sides.
If we insist on a ”super-efficient” verifier (i.e. with sublinear running time) we cannot use the
same approach as in Section 2.3.1 since we do not know how to bound the space S(n) used by a
computation in NC (and the verifier’s complexity in our protocol for bounded space computations,
depends on the space complexity of the underlying language). We get around this problem by
assuming a CRS, to which the verifier has oracle access.
We start by describing a rational proof with oracle access for BPP and then we show how to
remoe the oracle access (via our composition theorem) for the case of BPNC.
Let L ∈ BPP and let M a PTM that decides L in polynomial time and ρ(·) the randomness
complexity of M . For x ∈ {0, 1}∗ we denote by Lx the (deterministically decidable) language
{(x, r) : r ∈ {0, 1}ρ(|x|) ∧M(x, r) = L(x)}.
Lemma 2.4.4. Let L be a language in BPP. Then there exists a Lx-oracle rational proof with CRS
σ for L where |σ| = poly(n)ρ(n).
Proof. Our construction is as follows. W.l.o.g. we will assume σ to be divided in ` = poly(n)
blocks r1, ..., r`, each of size ρ(n).
1. The honest prover P runs M(x, ri) for 1 ≤ i ≤ ` and announces m the number of strings ri
s.t. M(x, ri) accepts, i.e.
∑
iM(x, ri);
CHAPTER 2. RATIONAL PROOFS FOR SUBCLASSES OF P 32
2. P sends m to x.
3. The Verifier accepts if m > `/2
We note that if we set yi = M(x, ri) then the prover is announcing the Hamming weight of the
string y1, . . . , y`. At this point we can use the Hamming weight verification protocol in Section 2.2
where the Verifier use the oracle for Lx to verify on her own the value of yi.
We note that no matter which protocol is used, round complexity, communication complexity
and verifier running time (not counting the oracle calls) are all polylog(n).
To obtain our result for BPNC we invoke the following result from [32]:
Theorem 2.4.5. NC ⊆ DRMA[polylog(n), polylog(n), polylog(n)]
The theorem above, together with Theorem 2.4.2 and Lemma 2.4.4 yields:
Corollary 2.4.6. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n and L ∈ BPNC. Assuming the existence of a (polynomially
long) CRS then there exists a rational proof for L with polylogarithmically many rounds, polylog-
arithmic communication and verification complexity.
Notice that some problems (e.g. perfect matching) are not known to be in NC but are known to
be in RNC ⊆ BPNC [41].
2.5 Lower Bounds for Rational Proofs
In this section we discuss how likely it is will be able to find very efficient non-cryptographic
rational protocols for the classes P and NP.
We denote by BPQP the class of languages decidable by a randomized algorithm running in
quasi-polynomial time, i.e. BPQP =
⋃
k>0 BPTIME[2
O(logk(n))]. Our theorem follows the same
approach of Theorem 16 in [31]6.
Theorem 2.5.1. NP 6⊆ DRMA[polylog(n), polylog(n), poly(n)] unless NP ⊆ BPQP.
6Since we only sketch our proof the reader is invited to see details of the proof [31]
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Proof Sketch: Assume there exists a rational proof piL for a language L ∈ NP with parameters
as the ones above. We can build a PTM M to decide L as follows:
• M generates all possible transcripts T for piL;
• For each T , M estimates the expected reward RT associated to that transcript by sampling
rew(T ) t times (recall the reward function is probabilistic);
• M returns the output associated to transcript T ∗ = arg maxT RT .
Consider that space of the transcripts of rational proof with a polylogarithmic number of rounds and
bits exchanged. The number of possible transcripts in such protocol is bounded by (2polylog(n))polylog(n) =
2polylog(n). Let ∆ be the (noticeable) reward gap of the protocol. By using Hoeffding’s inequality
we can prove M can approximate each RT within ∆/3 with probability 2/3 after t = poly(n)
samples. Recalling the definition of reward gap (see Remark 4), we conclude M can decide L in
randomized time 2polylog(n).

It is not known whether NP 6⊆ BPQP is true, although this assumption has been used to show
hardness of approximation results [44, 42]. Notice that this assumption implies NP 6⊆ BPP [39].
Let us now consider rational proofs for P. By the following theorem they might require
ω(log(n)) total communication complexity (since we believe P ⊆ BPNC to be unlikely [48] ).
Theorem 2.5.2. P 6⊆ DRMA[O(1), O(log(n)), polylog(n)] unless P ⊆ BPNC.
Proof Sketch: Given a language L ∈ P we build a machine M to decide L as in the proof
of Theorem 2.5.1. The only difference is that M can be simulated by a randomized circuit of
polylog(n) depth and polynomial size. In fact, all the possible 2O(log(n)) = poly(n) transcripts
can be simulated in parallel in O(log(n)) sequential time. The same holds computing the t =
poly(n) sample rewards for each of these transcripts. By assumption on the verifier’s running time,
each reward can be computed in polylogarithmic sequential time. Finally, the estimate of each
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transcript’s expected reward and the maximum among them can be computed in O(log(n)) depth.

Remark 3. Theorem 2.5.2 can be generalized to rational proofs with round and communication
complexities r and c such that r · c = O(log(n)).
Chapter 3
Rational Proofs for Costly Multiple
Delegations
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3.1 Profit vs. Reward
Let us now define the profit of the Prover as the difference between the reward paid by the verifier
and the cost incurred by the Prover to compute f and engage in the protocol. As already pointed
out in [5, 31] the definition of Rational Proof is sufficiently robust to also maximize the profit of
the honest prover and not the reward. Indeed consider the case of a ”lazy” prover P˜ that does not
evaluate the function: even if P˜ collects a ”small” reward, his total profit might still be higher than
the profit of the honest prover P .
Set R(x) = E[rew((P, V )(x))], R˜(x) = E[rew((P˜ , V )(x))] and C(x) [resp. C˜(x)] the cost for
P [resp. P˜ ] to engage in the protocol. Then we want
R(x)− C(x) ≥ R˜(x)− C˜(x) =⇒ δP˜ (x) ≥ C(x)− C˜(x)
In general this is not true (see for example the previous protocol), but it is always possible to
change the reward by a multiplier M . Note that if M ≥ C(x)/δP˜ (x) then we have that
M(R(x)− R˜(x)) ≥ C(x) ≥ C(x)− C˜(x)
as desired. Therefore by using the multiplier M in the reward, the honest prover P maximizes its
profit against all provers P˜ except those for which δP˜ (x) ≤ C(x)/M , i.e. those who report the
incorrect result with a ”small” probability P˜ (x) ≤ C(x)M∆(x) .
We note that M might be bounded from above, by budget considerations (i.e. the need to keep
the total reward MR(x) ≤ B for some budget B). This point out to the importance of a large
reward gap ∆(x) since the larger ∆(x) is, the smaller the probability of a cheating prover P˜ to
report an incorrect result must be, in order for P˜ to achieve an higher profit than P .
EXAMPLE. In the above protocol we can assume that the cost of the honest prover is C(x) = n,
and we know that ∆(x) = n2. Therefore the profit of the honest prover is maximized against all
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the provers that report an incorrect result with probability larger than n3/M , which can be made
sufficiently small by choosing the appropriate multiplier.
Remark 4. If we are interested in an asymptotic treatment, it is important to notice that as long
as ∆(x) ≥ 1/poly(|x|) then it is possible to keep a polynomial reward budget, and maximize the
honest prover profit against all provers who cheat with a substantial probability P˜ ≥ 1/poly′(|x|).
3.2 Sequential Composition
Until now we have only considered agents who want to maximize their reward. But the reward
alone, might not capture the complete utility function that the Prover is trying to maximize in his
interaction with the Verifier. In particular we have not considered the cost incurred by the Prover
to compute f and engage in the protocol. It makes sense then to define the profit of the Prover as
the difference between the reward paid by the verifier and such cost.
As already pointed out in [5, 31] the definition of Rational Proof is sufficiently robust to also
maximize the profit of the honest prover and not just the reward. Indeed consider the case of
a “lazy” prover P˜ that does not evaluate the function: let R˜(x), C˜(x) be the reward and cost
associated with P˜ on input x (while R(x), C(x) are the values associated with the honest prover).
Obviously we want
R(x)− C(x) ≥ R˜(x)− C˜(x) or equivalently R(x)− R˜(x) ≥ C(x)− C˜(x)
Recall the notion of reward gap which is the minimum difference between the reward of the honest
prover and any other prover
∆(x) ≤ R(x)− R˜(x)
To maximize the profit is therefore sufficient to change the reward by a a multiplierM = C(x)/∆(x)
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since then we have that
M(R(x)− R˜(x)) ≥ C(x) ≥ C(x)− C˜(x)
as desired. This explains why we require the reward gap to be at least the inverse of a polynomial,
since this will maintain the total reward paid by the Verifier bounded by a polynomial.
3.2.1 Motivating Example
We now show how in repeated executions of a Rational Proof a nd where the Prover has a ”budget”
of computation cost that he is willing to invest, then there is no guarantee anymore that the profit
is maximized by the honest prover. The reason is that it might be more profitable for the prover to
use his budget to provide many incorrect answers than to provide a single correct answer. That’s
because incorrect (e.g. random) answers are “cheaper” to compute than the correct one and with
the same budgetB the prover can provide many of them while the entire budget might be necessary
to solve a single problem correctly. If incorrect answers still receive a substantial reward then many
incorrect answers may be more profitable and a rational prover will choose that strategy.
This motivated us to consider a stronger definition which requires the reward to be somehow
connected to the ”effort” paid by the prover. The definition (stated below) basically says that if a
(possibly dishonest) prover invests less computation than the honest prover then he must collect a
smaller reward.
Consider the protocol in the previous section for the computation of the function Gn,k(·). As-
sume that the honest execution of the protocol (including the computation of Gn,k(·)) has cost
C = n.
Assume now that we are given a sequence of n inputs x(1), . . . , x(i), . . . where each x(i) is an
n-bit string. In the following let mi be the Hamming weight of x(i) and pi = mi/n.
Therefore the honest prover investing C = n cost, will be able to execute the protocol only
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only once, say on input x(i). By setting p = p˜ = pi in Eq. 2.1, we see that P obtains reward
R(x(i)) = 2(p2i − pi + 1) ≤ 2
Consider instead a prover P˜ which in the execution of the protocol outputs a random value m˜ ∈
[0..n]. The expected reward of P˜ on any input x(i) is (by setting p = pi and p˜ = m/n in Eq. 2.1
and taking expectations):
R˜(x(i)) = E
m,b
[BSR(
m
n
, b)]
=
1
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
E
b
[BSR(
m
n
, b]
=
1
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
(2(2pi · m
n
− m
2
n2
− pi + 1))
= 2− 2n+ 1
3n
> 1 for n > 1.
Therefore by ”solving” just two computations P˜ earns more than P . Moreover t the strategy of P˜
has cost 1 and therefore it earns more than P by investing a lot less cost1.
Note that ”scaling” the reward by a multiplier M does not help in this case, since both the
honest and dishonest prover’s rewards would be multiplied by the same multipliers, without any
effect on the above scenario.
We have therefore shown a rational strategy, where cheating many times and collecting many
rewards is more profitable than collecting a single reward for an honest computation.
1 If we think of cost as time, then in the same time interval in which P solves one problem, P˜ can solve up to n
problems, earning a lot more money, by answering fast and incorrectly.
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3.2.2 Sequentially Composable Rational Proofs
The above counterexample motivates the following Definition which formalizes that the reward of
the honest prover P must always be larger than the total reward of any prover P˜ that invests less
computation cost than P .
Technically this is not trivial to do, since it is not possible to claim the above for any prover P˜
and any sequence of inputs, because it is possible that for a given input x˜, the prover P˜ has ”hard-
wired” the correct value y˜ = f(x˜) and can compute it without investing any work. We therefore
propose a definition that holds for inputs randomly chosen according to a given probability distri-
butionD, and we allow for the possibility that the reward of a dishonest prover can be ”negligibly”
larger than the reward of the honest prover (for example if P˜ is lucky and such ”hardwired” inputs
are selected by D).
Definition 3.2.1 (Sequential Rational Proof). A rational proof (P, V ) for a function f : {0, 1}n→
{0, 1}n is (,K)-sequentially composable for an input distribution D, if for every prover P˜ , for
a sequence of inputs x, x1, . . . , xk drawn according toD such that C(x) ≥
∑k
i=1 C˜(xi) and k ≤ K
we have that
∑
i R˜(xi)−R ≤ .
A few sufficient conditions for sequential composability follow.
Lemma 3.2.2. Let (P, V ) be a rational proof. If for every input x it holds that R(x) = R and
C(x) = C for constants R and C, and the following inequality holds for every P˜ 6= P and input
x ∈ D:
R˜(x)
R
≤ C˜(x)
C
+ 
then (P, V ) is (KR,K)-sequentially composable for D
Proof. It suffices to observe that, for any k inputs x1, ..., xk, the inequality above implies
k∑
i=1
R˜(xi) ≤ R[
k∑
i=1
(
C˜(xi)
C
+ )] ≤ R + kR
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where the last inequality holds whenever
∑k
i=1 C˜(xi) ≤ C as in Definition 3.2.1.
Corollary 3.2.3. Let (P, V ) and rew be respectively an interactive proof and a reward function
as in Definition 2.2.1; if rew can only assume the values 0 and R for some constant R, let p˜x =
Pr[rew((P˜ , V )(x)) = R]. If for x ∈ D
p˜x ≤ C˜(x)
C
+ 
then (P, V ) is (KR,K)-sequentially composable for D.
Proof. Observe that R˜(x) = p˜x ·R and then apply Lemma 3.2.2.
3.2.3 Sequential Rational Proofs in the PCP model
We now describe a rational proof appeared in [5] and prove that is sequentially composable. The
protocol assumes the existence of a trusted memory storage to which both Prover and Verifier have
access, to realize the so-called ”PCP” (Probabilistically Checkable Proof) model. In this model,
the Prover writes a very long proof of correctness, that the verifier checks only in a few randomly
selected position. The trusted memory is needed to make sure that the prover is ”committed” to
the proof before the verifier starts querying it.
The following protocol for proofs on a binary logical circuit C appeared in [5]. The Prover
writes all the (alleged) values αw for every wire in w ∈ C, on the trusted memory location. The
Verifier samples a single randome gate value to check its correctness and determines the reward
accordingly:
1. The Prover writes the vector {αw}w∈C
2. The Verifier samples a random gate g ∈ C.
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• The Verifier reads αgout , αgL , αgR , with gout, gL, gR being respectively the output, left
and right input wires of g; the verifier checks that αgout = g(αgL , αgR);
• If g in an input gate the Verifier also checks that αgL , αgR correspond to the correct
input values;
The Verifier pays R if both checks are satisfied, otherwise it pays 0.
Theorem 3.2.4 ([5]). The protocol above is a rational proof for any boolean function in P ||NP , the
class of all languages decidable by a polynomial time machine that can make non-adaptive queries
to NP .
We will now show a cost model where the rational proof above is sequentially composable.
We will assume that the cost for any prover is given by the number of gates he writes. Thus, for
any input x, the costs for honest and dishonest provers are respectively C(x) = S, where S = |C|,
and C˜(x) = s˜ where s˜ is the number of gates written by the dishonest prover. Observe that in this
model a dishonest prover may not write all the S gates, and that not all of the s˜ gates have to be
correct. Let σ ≤ s˜ the number of correct gates written by P˜ . Then
Theorem 3.2.5. In the cost model above the PCP protocol protocol in [5] is sequentially compos-
able.
Proof. Observe that the probability p˜x that P˜ 6= P earns R is such that
p˜x =
σ
S
≤ s˜
S
=
C˜
C
Applying Corollary 3.2.3 completes the proof.
The above cost model, basically says that the cost of writing down a gate dominates everything
else, in particular the cost of computing that gate. In other cost models a proof of sequential
composition may not be as straightforward. Assume, for example, that the honest prover pays $1
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to compute the value of a single gate while writing down that gate is ”free”. Now p˜x is still equal
to σ
S
but to prove that this is smaller than C˜
C
we need some additional assumption that limits the
ability for P˜ to ”guess” the right value of a gate without computing it (which we will discuss in
the next Section).
3.2.4 Sequential Composition and the Unique Inner State Assumption
Definition 3.2.1 for sequential rational proofs requires a relationship between the reward earned
by the prover and the amount of ”work” the prover invested to produce that result. The intuition
is that to produce the correct result, the prover must run the computation and incur its full cost.
Unfortunately this intuition is difficult, if not downright impossible, to formalize. Indeed for a
specific input x a ”dishonest” prover P˜ could have the correct y = f(x) value ”hardwired” and
could answer correctly without having to perform any computation at all. Similarly, for certain
inputs x, x′ and a certain function f , a prover P˜ after computing y = f(x) might be able to
”recycle” some of the computation effort (by saving some state) and compute y′ = f(x′) incurring
a much smaller cost than computing it from scratch.
A way to circumvent this problem was suggested in [8] under the name of Unique Inner State
Assumption: the idea is to assume a distribution D over the input space. When inputs x are chosen
according to D, then we assume that computing f requires cost C from any party: this can be
formalized by saying that if a party invests C˜ = γC effort (for γ ≤ 1), then it computes the
correct value only with probability negligibly close to γ (since a party can always have a ”mixed”
strategy in which with probability γ it runs the correct computation and with probability 1−γ does
something else, like guessing at random).
Assumption 3.2.6. We say that the (C,)-Unique Inner State Assumption holds for a function f
and a distribution D if for any algorithm P˜ with cost C˜ = γC, the probability that on input x ∈ D,
P˜ outputs f(x) is at most γ + (1− γ).
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Note that the assumption implicitly assumes a ”large” output space for f (since a random guess
of the output of f will be correct with probability 2−n where n is the binary length of f(x)).
More importantly, note that Assumption 3.2.6 immediately yields our notion of sequential com-
posability, if the Verifier can detect if the Prover is lying or not. Assume, as a mental experiment
for now, that given input x, the Prover claims that y˜ = f(x) and the Verifier checks by recomputing
y = f(x) and paying a reward ofR to the Prover if y = y˜ and 0 otherwise. Clearly this is not a very
useful protocol, since the Verifier is not saving any computation effort by talking to the Prover. But
it is sequentially composable according to our definition, since p˜x, the probability that P˜ collects
R, is equal to the probability that P˜ computes f(x) correctly, and by using Assumption 3.2.6 we
have that
p˜x = γ + (1− γ) ≤ C˜
C
+ 
satisfying Corollary 3.2.3.
To make this a useful protocol we adopt a strategy from [8], which also uses this idea of
verification by recomputing. Instead of checking every execution, we check only a random subset
of them, and therefore we can amortize the Verifier’s effort over a large number of computations.
Fix a parameter m. The prover sends to the verifier the values y˜j which are claimed to be the result
of computing f over m inputs x1, . . . , xm. The verifier chooses one index i randomly between 1
and m, and computes yi = f(xi). If yi = y˜i the verifier pays R, otherwise it pays 0.
Let T be the total cost by the honest prover to compute m instances: cleary T = mC. Let
T˜ = ΣiC˜i be the total effort invested by P˜ , by investing C˜i on the computation of xi. In order to
satisfy Corollary 3.2.3 we need that p˜x, the probability that P˜ collects R, be less than T˜ /T + .
Let γi = C˜i/C, then under Assumption 3.2.6 we have that y˜i is correct with probability at most
γi + (1− γi). Therefore if we set γ =
∑
i γi/m we have
p˜x =
1
m
∑
i
[γi + (1− γi)] = γ + (1− γ) ≤ γ + 
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But note that γ = T˜ /T as desired since
T˜ =
∑
i
C˜i =
∑
i
γiC = T
∑
i
γi/m
EFFICIENCY OF THE VERIFIER. If our notion of ”efficient Verifier” is a verifier who runs in time
o(C) where C is the time to compute f , then in the above protocol m must be sufficiently large
to amortize the cost of computing one execution over many (in particular a constant – in the input
size n – value of m would not work). In our ”concrete analysis” treatment, if we requests that the
Verifier runs in time δC for an ”efficiency” parameter δ ≤ 1, then we need m ≥ δ−1.
Therefore we are still in need of a protocol which has an efficient Verifier, and would still
works for the ”stand-alone” case (m = 1) but also for the case of sequential composability over
any number m of executions.
3.3 Our Protocol
We now present a protocol that works for functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n expressed by an arith-
metic circuit C of size C and depth d and fan-in 2, given as a common input to both Prover and
Verifier together with the input x.
Intuitively the idea is for the Prover to provide the Verifier with the output value y and its two
”children” yL, yR in the gate, i.e. the two input values of the last output gateG. The Verifier checks
that G(yL, yR) = y, and then asks the Prover to verify that yL or yR (chosen a random) is correct,
by recursing on the above test. The protocol description follows.
1. The Prover evaluates the circuit on x and send the output value y1 to the Verifier.
2. Repeat r times: The Verifier identifies the root gate g1 and then invokes Round(1, g1, y1),
where the procedure Round(i, gi, yi) is defined for 1 ≤ i ≤ d as follows:
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1. The Prover sends the value of the input wires z0i and z
1
i of gi to the Verifier.
2. The Verifiers performs the following
• Check that yi is the result of the operation of gate gi on inputs z0i and z1i . If not STOP
and pay a reward of 0.
• If i = d (i.e. if the inputs to gi are input wires), check that the values of z0i and z1i are
equal to the corresponding bits of x. Pay reward R to Merlin if this is the case, nothing
otherwise.
• If i < d, choose a random bit b, send it to Merlin and invoke Round(i + 1, gbi+1, zbi )
where gbi+1 is the child gate of gi whose output is z
b
i .
3.3.1 Efficiency
The protocol runs at most in d rounds. In each round, the Prover sends a constant number of bits
representing the values of specific input and output wires; The Verifier sends at most one bit per
round, the choice of the child gate. Thus the communication complexity is O(d) bits.
The computation of the Verifier in each round is: (i) computing the result of a gate and checking
for bit equality; (ii) sampling a child. Gate operations and equality are O(1) per round. We assume
our circuits are T -uniform, which allows the Verifier to select the correct gate in time T (n) 2 Thus
the Verifier runs in O(rd · T (n)) with r = O(logC).
3.3.2 Proofs of (stand-alone) Rationality
Theorem 3.3.1. The protocol in Section 3.3 for r = 1 is a Rational Proof according to Def. 2.2.1.
We prove the above theorem by showing that for every input x the reward gap ∆(x) is positive.
2 We point out that the Prover can provide the Verifier with the requested gate and then the Verifier can use the
uniformity of the circuit to check that the Prover has given him the correct gate in time O(T (n))) at each level in
O(T (n)).
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Proof. Let P˜ a prover that always reports y˜ 6= y1 = f(x) at Round 1.
Let us proceed by induction on the depth d of the circuit. If d = 1 then there is no possibility
for P˜ to cheat successfully, and its reward is 0.
Assume d > 1. We can think of the binary circuit C as composed by two subcircuits CL and
CR and the output gate g1 such that f(x) = g1(CL(x), CR(x)). The respective depths dL, dR of
these subcircuits are such that 0 ≤ dL, dR ≤ d − 1 and max(dL, dR) = d − 1. After sending y˜,
the protocol requires that P˜ sends output values for CL(x) and CR(x); let us denote these claimed
values respectively with y˜L and y˜R. Notice that at least one of these alleged values will be different
from the respective correct subcircuit output: if it were otherwise, V would reject immediately as
g(y˜L, y˜R) = f(x) 6= y˜. Thus at most one of the two values y˜L, y˜R is equal to the output of the
corresponding subcircuit. The probability that the P˜ cheats successfully is:
Pr[V accepts] ≤ 1
2
· (Pr[V accepts on CL] + Pr[V accepts on CR]) (3.1)
≤ 1
2
· (1− 2−max(dL,dR)) + 1
2
(3.2)
≤ 1
2
· (1− 2−d+1) + 1
2
(3.3)
= 1− 2−d (3.4)
At line 3.2 we used the inductive hypothesis and the fact that all probabilities are at most 1.
Therefore the expected reward of P˜ is R˜ ≤ R(1 − 2−d) and the reward gap is ∆(x) = 2−dR
(see Remark 5 below to explain the equality).
The following useful corollary follows from the proof above.
Corollary 3.3.2. If the protocol described in Section 3.3 is repeated r ≥ 1 times a prover can
cheat with probability at most (1− 2−d)r.
Remark 5. We point out that one can always build a prover strategy P ∗ which always answers
incorrectly and achieves exactly the reward R∗ = R(1− 2−d). This prover outputs an incorrect y˜
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and then computes one of the subcircuits that results in one of the input values (so that at least one
of the inputs is correct). This will allow him to recursively answer with values z0i and z
1
i where one
of the two is correct, and therefore be caught only with probability 2−d.
Remark 6. In order to have a non-negligible reward gap (see Remark 4) we need to limit ourselves
to circuits of depth d = O(log n).
3.3.3 Proof of Sequential Composability
General sufficient conditions for sequential composability
Lemma 3.3.3. Let C be a circuit of depth d. If the (C, ) Unique Inner State Assumption (see
Assumption 3.2.6) holds for the function f computed by C, and input distribution D, then the
protocol presented above with r repetitions is a kR-sequentially composable Rational Proof for C
for D if the following inequality holds
(1− 2−d)r ≤ 1
C
Proof. Let γ = C˜
C
. Consider x ∈ D and prover P˜ which invests effort C˜ ≤ C. Under Assump-
tion 3.2.6, P˜ gives the correct outputs with probability γ +  – assume that in this case P˜ collects
the reward R. If P˜ gives an incorrect output we know (following Corollary 3.3.2) that he collects
the reward R with probability at most (1− 2−d)r which by hypothesis is less than γ. So either way
we have that R˜ ≤ (γ + )R and therefore applying Lemma 3.2.2 concludes the proof.
The problem with the above Lemma is that it requires a large value of r for the result to be true
resulting in an inefficient Verifier. In the following sections we discuss two approaches that will
allows us to prove sequential composability even for an efficient Verifier:
• Limiting the class of provers we can handle in our security proof;
• Limiting the class of functions/circuits.
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Limiting the strategy of the prover: Non-adaptive Provers
In proving sequential composability it is useful to find a connection between the amount of work
done by a dishonest prover and its probability of cheating. The more a dishonest prover works,
the higher its probability of cheating. This is true for our protocol, since the more ”subcircuits”
the prover computes correctly, the higher is probability of convincing the verifier of an incorrect
output becomes. The question then is how can a prover who has an ”effort budget” to spend, can
maximize its probability of success in our protocol.
As we discussed in Remark 5, there is an adaptive strategy for the P˜ to maximize its probability
of success: compute one subcircuit correctly at every round of the protocol. We call this strategy
”adaptive”, because the prover allocates its ”effort budget” C˜ on the fly during the execution of
the rational proof. Conversely a non-adaptive prover P˜ uses C˜ to compute some subcircuits in
C before starting the protocol. Clearly an adaptive prover strategy is more powerful, than a non-
adaptive one (since the adaptive prover can direct its computation effort where it matters most, i.e.
where the Verifier ”checks” the computation).
Is it possible to limit the Prover to a non-adaptive strategy? This could be achieved by imposing
some ”timing” constraints to the execution of the protocol: to prevent the prover from perform-
ing large computations while interacting with the Verifier, the latter could request that prover’s
responses be delivered ”immediately”, and if a delay happens then the Verifier will not pay the
reward. Similar timing constraints have been used before in the cryptographic literature, e.g. see
the notion of timing assumptions in the concurrent zero-knowedge protocols in [22].
Therefore in the rest of this subsection we assume that non-adaptive strategies are the only ra-
tional ones and proceed in analyzing our protocol under the assumption that the prover is adopting
a non-adaptive strategy.
Consider a prover P˜ with effort budget C˜ < C. A DFS (for ”depth first search”) prover uses
its effort budget C˜ to compute a whole subcircuit of size C˜ and maximal depth dDFS . Call this
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subcircuit CDFS . P˜ can answer correctly any verifier’s query about a gate in CDFS . During the
interaction with V , the behavior of a DFS prover is as follows:
• At the beginning of the protocol send an arbitrary output value y1.
• During procedure Round(i, gi, yi):
– If gi ∈ CDFS then P˜ sends the two correct inputs z0i and z1i .
– If gi 6∈ CDFS and neither of gi’s input gate belongs to CDFS then P˜ sends two arbitrary
z0i and z
1
i that are consistent with yi, i.e. gi(z
0
i , z
1
i ) = yi.
– gi 6∈ CDFS and one of gi’s input gates belongs to CDFS , then P˜ will send the correct
wire known to him and another arbitrary value consistent with yi as above.
Lemma 3.3.4 (Advantage of a DFS prover). In one repetition of the protocol above, a DFS prover
with effort budget C˜ investment has probability of cheating p˜DFS defined by
p˜FS ≤ 1− 2−dDFS
The proof of Lemma 3.3.4 follows easily from the proof of the stand-alone rationality of our
protocol (see Theorem 3.3.1).
If a DFS prover focuses on maximizing the depth of a computed subcircuit given a certain
investment, BFS provers allot their resources to compute all subcircuits rooted at a certain height.
A BFS prover with effort budget C˜ computes the value of all gates up to the maximal height
possible dBFS . Note that dBFS is a function of the circuit C and of the effort C˜. Let CBFS be
the collection of gates computed by the BFS prover. The interaction of a BFS prover with V
throughout the protocol resembles that of the DFS prover outlined above:
• At the beginning of the protocol send an arbitrary output value y1.
• During procedure Round(i, gi, yi):
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– If gi ∈ CBFS then P˜ sends the two correct inputs z0i and z1i .
– If gi 6∈ CBFS and neither of gi’s input gate belongs to CBFS then P˜ sends two arbitrary
z0i and z
1
i that are consistent with yi, i.e. gi(z
0
i , z
1
i ) = yi.
– gi 6∈ CBFS and both gi’s input gates belong to CDFS , then P˜ will send one of the correct
wires known to him and another arbitrary value consistent with yi as above.
As before, it is not hard to see that the probability of successful cheating by a BFS prover can be
bounded as follows:
Lemma 3.3.5 (Advantage of a BFS prover). In one repetition of the protocol above, a BFS prover
with effort budget C˜ has probability of cheating p˜BFS bounded by
p˜ ≤ 1− 2−dBFS
BFS and DFS provers are both special cases of the general non-adaptive strategy which allots
its investment C˜ among a general collection of subcircuits CNA. The interaction with V of such a
prover is analogous to that of a a BFS/DFS prover but with a collection of computed subcircuits
not constrained by any specific height. We now try to formally define what the success probability
of such a prover is.
Definition 3.3.6 (Path experiment). Consider a circuit C and a collection CNA of subcircuits of
C. Perform the following experiment: starting from the output gate, flip a biased coin and choose
the ”left” subcircuit or the ”right” subcircuit at random with probability 1/2. Continue until the
random path followed by the experiment reaches a computed gate in CNA. Let i be the height of
this gate, which is the output of the experiment. Define with Πi the probability that this experiment
outputs i.
The proof of the following Lemma is a generalization of the proof of security of our scheme.
Once the ”verification path” chosen by the Verifier enters a fully computed subcircuit at height
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i (which happens with probability ΠCNAi ), the probability of success of the Prover is bounded by
(1− 2−i)
Lemma 3.3.7 (Advantage of a non adaptive prover). In one repetition of the protocol above, a
generic prover with effort budget C˜ used to compute a collection CNA of subcircuits, has probabil-
ity of cheating p˜CNA bounded by
p˜CNA ≤
d∑
i=0
Πi(1− 2−i)
where Πi-s are defined as in Definition 3.3.6.
Limiting the class of functions: Regular Circuits
Lemma 3.3.7 still does not produce a clear bound on the probability of success of a cheating
prover. The reason is that it is not obvious how to bound the probabilities ΠCNAi that arise from the
computed subcircuits CNA since those depends in non-trivial ways from the topology of the circuit
C.
We now present a type of circuits for which it can be shown that the BFS strategy is optimal.
The restriction on the circuit is surprisingly simple: we call them regular circuits. In the next
section we show examples of interesting functions that admit regular circuits.
Definition 3.3.8 (Regular circuit). A circuit C is said to be regular if the following conditions hold:
• C is layered;
• every gate has fan-in 2;
• the inputs of every gate are the outputs of two distinct gates.
The following lemma states that, in regular circuits, we can bound the advantage of any prover
investing C˜ by looking at the advantage of a BFS prover with the same investment.
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Lemma 3.3.9 (A bound for provers’ advantage in regular circuits). Let P˜ be a prover investing C˜.
Let C be the circuit being computed and δ = dBFS(C, C˜). In one repetition of the protocol above,
the advantage of P˜ is bounded by
p˜ ≤ p˜BFS = 1− 2−δ
Proof. Let CNA be the family of subcircuits compued by P˜ with effort C˜. As pointed out above
the probability of success for P˜ is
p˜ ≤
d∑
i=0
ΠCNAi (1− 2−i)
Consider now a prover P˜ ′ which uses C˜ effort to compute a different collection of subcircuits C ′NA
defined as follows:
• Remove a gate from a subcircuit of height j in CNA: this produces two subcircuits of height
j − 1. This is true because of the regularity of the circuit: since the inputs of every gate are
the outputs of two distinct gates, when removing a gate of height j this will produce two
subcircuits of height j − 1;
• Use that computation to ”join” two subcircuits of height k into a single subcircuit of height
k + 1. Again we are using the regularity of the circuit here: since the circuit is layered, the
only way to join two subcircuits into a single computed subcircuit is to take two subcircuits
of the same height.
What happens to the probability p˜′ of success of P˜ ′? Let ` be the number of possible paths gener-
ated by the experiment above with CNA. Then the probability of entering a computed subcircuit at
height j decreases by 1/` and that probability weight goes to entering at height j − 1. Similarly
the probability of entering at height k goes down by 2/` and that probability weight is shifted to
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entering at height k + 1. Therefore
p˜′ ≤
∑
i 6=j,j−1,k,k+1
Πi(1− 2−i)+
+(Πj − 1
`
)(1− 2−j) + (Πj−1 + 1
`
)(1− 2−j+1)+
+(Πk − 2
`
)(1− 2−k) + (Πk+1 + 2
`
)(1− 2−k−1) =
= p˜+
1
`2j
− 1
`2j−1
+
1
`2k−1
− 1
`2k
= p˜+
2k − 2k+1 + 2j+1 − 2j
`2j+k
= p˜+
2j − 2k
`2j+k
Note that p˜′ increases if j > k which means that it’s better to take ”computation” away from tall
computed subcircuits to make them shorter, and use the saved computation to increase the height of
shorter computed subtrees, and therefore that the probability is maximized when all the subtrees are
of the same height, i.e. by the BFS strategy which has probability of success p˜BFS = 1− 2−δ.
The above Lemma, therefore, yields the following
Theorem 3.3.10. Let C be a regular circuit of size C. If the (C, ) Unique Inner State Assumption
(see Assumption 3.2.6) holds for the function f computed by C, and input distribution D, then the
protocol presented above with r repetitions is a kR-sequentially composable Rational Proof for C
for D if the prover follows a non-adaptive strategy and the following inequality holds for all C˜
(1− 2−δ)r ≤ C˜
C
where δ = dBFS(C, C˜).
Proof. Let γ = C˜
C
. Consider x ∈ D and prover P˜ which invests effort C˜ ≤ C. Under Assump-
tion 3.2.6, P˜ gives the correct outputs with probability γ +  – assume that in this case P˜ collects
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the reward R.
If P˜ gives an incorrect output we can invoke Lemma 3.3.9 and conclude that he collects reward
R with probability at most (1 − 2−δ)r which by hypothesis is less than γ. So either way we have
that R˜ ≤ (γ + )R and therefore applying Lemma 3.2.2 concludes the proof.
3.4 Results for FFT circuits
In this section we apply the previous results to the problem of computing FFT circuits, and by
extension to polynomial evaluations.
3.4.1 FFT circuit for computing a single coefficient
The Fast Fourier Transform is an almost ubiquitous computational problem that appears in many
applications, including many of the volunteer computations that motivated our work. As described
in [17] a circuit to compute the FFT of a vector of n input elements, consists of log n levels, where
each level comprises n/2 butterflies gates. The output of the circuit is also a vector of n input
elements.
Let us focus on the circuit that computes a single element of the output vector: it has log n
levels, and at level i it has n/2i butterflies gates. Moreover the circuit is regular, according to
Definition 3.3.8.
Theorem 3.4.1. Under the (C, )-unique inner state assumption for input distribution D, the pro-
tocol in Section 3.3, when repeated r = O(1) times, yields sequentially composable rational proofs
for the FFT, under input distribution D and assuming non-adaptive prover strategies.
Proof. Since the circuit is regular we can prove sequential composability by invoking Theorem 3.3.10
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and proving that for r = O(1), the following inequality holds
p˜ = (1− 2−δ)r ≤ C˜
C
where δ = dBFS(C, C˜).
But for any δ˜ < d, the structure of the FFT circuit inmplies that the number of gates below
height δ˜ is C˜δ˜ = Θ(C(1− 2−δ˜)). Thus the inequality above can be satisfied with r = Θ(1).
3.4.2 Mixed Strategies for Verification
One of the typical uses of the FFT is to change representation for polynomials. Given a polynomial
P (x) of degree n− 1 we can represent it as a vector of n coefficients [a0, . . . , an−1] or as a vector
of n points [P (ω0), . . . , P (ωn−1)]. If ωi are the complext n-root of unity, the FFT is the algorithm
that goes from one representation to the other in O(n log n) time, rather than the obvious O(n2).
In this section we consider the following problem: given two polynomial P,Q of degree n− 1
in point representation, compute the inner product of the coefficients of P,Q. A fan-in two circuit
computing this function could be built as follows:
• two parallel FFT subcircuits computing the coefficient representation of P,Q (log n-depth
and n log n) size total for the 2 circuits) ;
• a subcircuit where at the first level the i-degree coefficients are multiplied with each other,
and then all these products are added by a binary tree of additions O(log n)-depth and O(n)
size);
Note that this circuit is regular, and has depth 2 log n+ 1 and size n log n+ n+ 1
Consider a prover P˜ who pays C˜ < n log n effort. Then, since the BFS strategy is optimal, the
probability of convincing the Verifier of a wrong result of the FFT is (1− 2−d˜)r where d˜ = c log n
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with c ≤ 1 . Note also that C˜
C
< 1. Therefore with r = O(nc) repetitions, the probability of
success can be made smaller than C˜
C
. The Verifier’s complexity is O(nc log n) = o(n log n).
If C˜ ≥ n log n the analysis above fails since d˜ > log n. Here we observe that in order for P˜ to
earn a larger reward than P , it must be that P has run at least k = O(log n) executions (since it is
possible to find k + 1 inputs such that (k + 1)C˜ ≤ kC only if k > log n). In this case we can use
a ”mixed” strategy for verification:
• The Verifier pays the Prover only after k executions. Each execution is verified as above
(with nc repetitions);
• Additionally the Verifier uses the ”check by re-execution” (from Section 3.2.4) strategy every
k executions (verifiying one execution by recomputing it);
• The Verifier pays R if all the checks are satisfied, 0 otherwise;
• The Verifier’s complexity is O(knc log n + n log n) = o(kn log n) – the latter being the
complexity of computing k instances.
3.5 Sequential Composability for Space Bounded Computation
The intuition behind our definition and Lemma 3.2.3 is that to produce the correct result, the prover
must run the computation and incur its full cost; moreover for a dishonest prover his probability of
”success” has to be no bigger than the fraction of the total cost incurred.
This intuition is impossible, to formalize if we do not introduce a probability distribution over
the input space. Indeed for a specific input x a ”dishonest” prover P˜ could have the correct y =
f(x) value ”hardwired” and could answer correctly without having to perform any computation at
all. Similarly, for certain inputs x, x′ and a certain function f , a prover P˜ after computing y = f(x)
might be able to ”recycle” some of the computation effort (by saving some state) and compute
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y′ = f(x′) incurring a much smaller cost than computing it from scratch. This is the reason
our definition is parametrized over an input distribution D (and all the expectations, including the
computation of the reward, are taken over the probability of selecting a given input x).
A way to address this problem was suggested in [8] under the name of Unique Inner State
Assumption (UISA): when inputs x are chosen according to D, then we assume that computing f
requires cost T from any party: this can be formalized by saying that if a party invests t = γT
effort (for γ ≤ 1), then it computes the correct value only with probability negligibly close to γ
(since a party can always have a ”mixed” strategy in which with probability γ it runs the correct
computation and with probability 1− γ does something else, like guessing at random).
Using this assumption [8] solve the problem of the ”repeated executions with budget” by requir-
ing the verifier to check the correctness of a random subset of the the prover’s answer by running
the computation herself on that subset. This makes the verifier ”efficient” only in an amortized
sense.
In [14] we formalized the notion of Sequential Composability in Definition 3.2.1 and, using a
variation of the UISA, we showed protocols that are sequentially composable where the verifier is
efficient (i.e. polylog verification time) on each execution. Unfortunately that proof of sequential
composability works only for a limited subclass of log-depth circuits.
3.5.1 Sequential Composability of our new protocol
To prove our protocol to be sequentially composable we need two main assumptions which we
discuss now.
HARDNESS OF GUESSING STATES. Our protocol imposes very weak requirements on the prover:
the verifier just checks a single computation step in the entire process, albeit a step chosen at
random among the entire sequence. We need an equivalent of the UISA which states that for every
correct transition that the prover is able to produce he must pay ”one” computation step. More
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formally for any Turing Machine M we say that pair of configuration γ, γ′ is M -correct if γ′ can
be obtained from γ via a single computation step of M .
Definition 3.5.1 (Hardness of State Guessing Assumption). Let M be a Turing Machine and let
LM be the language recognized by M . We say that the Hardness of State Guessing Assumption
holds for M , for distributionD and security parameter  if for any machine A running in time t the
probability that A on input x outputs more than t, M -correct pairs of configurations is at most 
(where the probability is taken over the choice of x according to the distributionD and the internal
coin tosses of A).
ADAPTIVE VS. NON-ADAPTIVE PROVERS. Assumption 3.5.1 guarantees that to come up with t
correct transitions, the prover must invest at least t amount of work. We now move to the ultimate
goal which is to link the amount of work invested by the prover, to his probability of success. As
discussed in [14] it is useful to distinguish between adaptive and non-adaptive provers.
When running a rational proof on the computation of M over an input x, an adaptive prover
allocates its computational budget on the fly during the execution of the rational proof. Conversely a
non-adaptive prover P˜ uses his computational budget to compute as much as possible about M(x)
before starting the protocol with the verifier. Clearly an adaptive prover strategy is more powerful
than a non-adaptive one (since the adaptive prover can direct its computation effort where it matters
most, i.e. where the Verifier ”checks” the computation).
As an example, it is not hard to see that in our protocol an adaptive prover can succesfully
cheat without investing much computational effort at all. The prover will answer at random until
the very last step when he will compute and answer with a correct transition. Even if we invoke
Assumption 3.5.1 a prover that invests only one computational step has a probability of success of
1 − 1
poly(n)
(indeed the prover fails only if we end up checking against the initial configuration –
this is the attack that makes Theorem 2.3.1 tight.).
Is it possible to limit the Prover to a non-adaptive strategy? As pointed out in [14] this could
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be achieved by imposing some ”timing” constraints to the execution of the protocol: to prevent
the prover from performing large computations while interacting with the Verifier, the latter could
request that prover’s responses be delivered ”immediately”, and if a delay happens then the Verifier
will not pay the reward. Similar timing constraints have been used before in the cryptographic
literature, e.g. see the notion of timing assumptions in the concurrent zero-knowedge protocols in
[22]. Note that in order to require an ”immediate” answer from the prover it is necessary that the
latter stores all the intermediate configurations, which is why we require the prover to run in space
O(T (n)S(n)) – this condition is not needed for the protocol to be rational in the stand-alone case,
since even the honest prover could just compute the correct transition on the fly. Still this could be
a problematic approach if the protocol is conducted over a network since the network delay will
most likely be larger than the computation effort required by the above ”cheating” strategy.
Another option is to assume that the Prover is computationally bounded (e.g. the rational ar-
gument model introduced in [31]) and ask the prover to commit to all the configurations in the
computation before starting the interaction with the verifier. Then instead of sending the config-
uration, the prover will decommit it (if the decommitment fails, the verifier stops and pays 0 as
a reward). If we use a Merke-tree committment, these steps can be performed and verified in
O(log n) time.
In any case, for the proof we assume that non-adaptive strategies are the only rational ones and
proceed in analyzing our protocol under the assumption that the prover is adopting a non-adaptive
strategy.
THE PROOF. Under the above two assumptions, the proof of sequential composability is almost
immediate.
Theorem 3.5.2. Let L ∈ DTISP[poly(n), S(n)] and M be a Turing Machine recognizing L. As-
sume that Assumption 3.5.1 holds for M , under input distribution D and parameter . Moreover
assume the prover follows a non-adaptive strategy. Then the protocol of Section 2.3 is a (KR,K)-
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sequentially composable rational proof under D for any K ∈ N, R ∈ R≥0.
Proof. Let P˜ be a prover with a running time of t on input x. Let T be the total number of
transitions required by M on input x, i.e. the computational cost of the honest prover.
Observe that p˜x is the probability that V makes the final check on one of the transitions correctly
computed by P˜ . Because of Assumption 3.5.1 we know that the probability that P˜ can compute
more than t correct transitions is , therefore an upperbound on p˜x is tT + and the Theorem follows
from Corollary 3.2.3.
Chapter 4
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4.1 Preliminaries
In this chapter, all arithmetic computations (such as sums, inner product, matrix products, etc.) in
this work will be over GF(2) unless specified otherwise.
Definition 4.1.1 (Function Family). A function family is a family of (possibly randomized) func-
tions F = {fλ}λ∈N, where for each λ, fλ has domain Dfλ and co-domain Rfλ. A class C is a
collection of function families.
In most of our constructions Dfλ = {0, 1}d
f
λ and Rfλ = {0, 1}r
f
λ for sequences {dfλ}λ, {dfλ}λ.
In the rest of the paper we will focus on the class of C = NC1 of functions for which there
is a polynomial p(·) and a constant c such that for each λ, the function fλ can be computed by a
Boolean (randomized) fan-in 2, circuit of size p(λ) and depth c log(λ). In the formal statements
of our results we will also use the following classes: AC0, the class of functions of polynomial
size and constant depth with AND,OR and NOT gates with unbounded fan-in; AC0[2], the class
of functions of polynomial size and constant depth with AND,OR,NOT and PARITY gates with
unbounded fan-in. For a gate g we denote by typeC(g) the type of the gate g in the circuit C and by
parentsC(g) the list of gates of C whose output is an input to C (such list may potentially contain
duplicates).
Given a function f , we can think of its multiplicative depth as the degree of the lowest-degree
polynomial in GF(2) that evaluates to f . Similarly, we define the multiplicative depth of a circuit
as follows:
Definition 4.1.2 (Multiplicative Depth). Let C be a circuit, we define the multiplicative depth of
C as md(gout) where gout is its output gate and the function md, from the set of gates to the set of
natural numbers is recursively defined as follows:
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md(g) :=

1 if typeC(g) = input
max{md(g′) : g′ ∈ parentsC(g)} if typeC(g) = XOR∑
g′∈parentsC(g)
md(g′) if typeC(g) ∈ {AND,OR}
The following two circuit classes will appear in several of our results.
Definition 4.1.3 (Circuits with Constant Multiplicative Depth). We denote by AC0CM[2] the class of
circuits in AC0[2] with constant multiplicative depth.
Definition 4.1.4 (Circuits with Quasi-Constant Multiplicative Depth). For a circuit C we denote
by Sω(1)(C) the set of AND and OR gates in C with non-constant fan-in. We say that C has quasi-
constant multiplicative depth if |Sω(1)(C)| = O(1). We shall denote by AC0Q[2] the class of circuits
in AC0[2] with quasi-constant multiplicative depth.
LIMITED ADVERSARIES. We define adversaries also as families of randomized algorithms {Aλ}λ,
one for each security parameter (note that this is a non-uniform notion of security). We denote the
class of adversaries we consider as A, and in the rest of the paper we will also restrict A to NC1.
INFINITELY-OFTEN SECURITY. We now move to define security against all adversaries {Aλ}λ
that belong to a class A.
Our results achieve an ”infinitely often” notion of security, which states that for all adversaries
outside of our permitted class A our security property holds infinitely often (i.e. for an infinite
sequence of security parameters rather than for every sufficiently large security parameter. We
inherit this limitation from the techniques of [20].
Definition 4.1.5 (Infinitely-Often Computational Indistinguishability). LetX = {Xλ}λ∈N LetY =
{Yλ}λ∈N be ensembles over the same domain family, A a class of adversaries, and Λ an infinite
subset of N. We say that X and Y are infinitely often computational indistinguishable with respect
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to set Λ and the class A, denoted by X ∼Λ,A Y if there exists a negligible function ν such that for
any λ ∈ Λ and for any adversary A = {Aλ}λ ∈ A
|Pr[Aλ(Xλ) = 1]− Pr[Aλ(Yλ) = 1]| < ν(λ)
When A = NC1 we will keep it implicit and use the notation X ∼Λ Y and say that X and Y
are Λ-computationally indistinguishable.
In our proofs we will use the following facts on infinitely-often computationally indistinguish-
able ensembles. We skip their proof as, except for a few technicalities, it is analogous to the
corresponding properties for standard computational indistinguishability1.
Lemma 4.1.6 (Facts on Λ-Computational Indistinguishability). • Transitivity: Letm = poly(λ)
and X (j) with j ∈ {0, . . . ,m} be ensembles. If for all j ∈ [m] X (j−1) ∼Λ X (j), then
X (0) ∼Λ X (m).
• Weaker than statistical indistinguishability: Let X ,Y be statistically indistinguishable
ensembles. Then X ∼Λ Y for any infinite Λ ⊆ N
• Closure under NC1: Let X ,Y be ensembles and {fλ}λ∈N ∈ NC1. If X ∼Λ Y for some Λ
then fλ(X ) ∼Λ fλ(Y).
4.1.1 Public-Key Encryption
A public-key encryption scheme
PKE = (PKE.Keygen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) is a triple of algorithms which operate as follow:
• Key Generation. The algorithm (pk, sk) ← PKE.Keygen(1λ) takes a unary representation
of the security parameter and outputs a public key encryption key pk and a secret decryption
key sk.
1We refer the reader to [25].
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• Encryption. The algorithm c ← PKE.Encpk(µ) takes the public key pk and a single bit
message µ ∈ {0, 1} and outputs a ciphertext c. The notation PKE.Encpk(µ; r) will be used
to represent the encryption of a bit µ using randomness r.
• Decryption. The algorithm µ∗ ← PKE.Decsk(c) takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext c
and outputs a message µ∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
Obviously we require that µ =PKE.Decsk(PKE.Encpk(µ))
Definition 4.1.7 (CPA Security for PKE). A scheme PKE is IND-CPA secure if for an infinite
Λ ⊆ N we have
(pk,PKE.Encpk(0)) ∼Λ (pk,PKE.Encpk(1))
where (pk, sk)← PKE.Keygen(1λ).
Remark 7 (Security for Multiple Messages). Notice that by a standard hybrid argument and
Lemma 4.1.6 we can prove that any scheme secure according to Definition 4.1.7 is also secure
for multiple messages (i.e. the two sequences of encryptions bit by bit of two bit strings are com-
putationally indistinguishable). We will use this fact in the proofs in Section 4.3, but we do not
provide the formal definition for this type of security. We refer the reader to 5.4.2 in [26].
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption
A public-key encryption scheme is said to be homomorphic if there is an additional algorithm Eval
which takes a input the public key pk, the representation of a function f : {0, 1}l → {0, 1} and a
set of l ciphertexts c1, . . . , cl, and outputs a ciphertext cf 2.
We proceed to define the homomorphism property. The next notion of C-homomorphism is
sometimes also referred to as “somewhat homomorphism”.
2Notice that the syntax of Eval can also be extended to return a sequence of encryptions for the case of multi-output
functions. We will use this fact in Section 4.2.4. See also Remark 7.
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Definition 4.1.8 (C-homomorphism). Let C be a class of functions (together with their respective
representations). An encryption scheme PKE is C-homomorphic (or, homomorphic for the class
C) if for every function fλ where fλ ∈ F{fλ}λ∈N ∈ C and respective inputs µ1, . . . , µl ∈ {0, 1}
(where l = l(λ)), it holds that if (pk, sk)← PKE.Keygen(1λ) and ci ← PKE.Encpk(µi) then
Pr[PKE.Decsk(Evalpk(F, c1, . . . , cl)) 6= F (µ1, . . . , µl)] = neg(λ),
As usual we require the scheme to be non-trivial by requiring that the output of Eval is compact:
Definition 4.1.9 (Compactness). A homomorphic encryption scheme PKE is compact if there
exists a polynomial s in λ such that the output length of Eval is at most s(λ) bits long (regardless
of the function f being computed or the number of inputs).
Definition 4.1.10. Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N of arithmetic circuits in GF(2). A scheme PKE is leveled
C-homomorphic if it takes 1L as additional input in key generation, and can only evaluate depth-L
arithmetic circuits from C. The bound s(λ) on the ciphertext must remain independent of L.
4.1.2 Verifiable Computation
In a Verifiable Computation scheme a Client uses an untrusted server to compute a function f
over an input x. The goal is to prevent the Client from accepting an incorrect value y′ 6= f(x).
We require that the Client’s cost of running this protocol be smaller than the cost of computing the
function on his own. The following definition is from [23] which allows the client to run a possibly
expensive pre-processing step.
Definition 4.1.11 (Verifiable Computation Scheme). A verifiable computation scheme VC = (VC.KeyGen,VC.ProbGen,VC.Compute,VC.Verify)
consists of the four algorithms defined below.
1. VC.KeyGen(f, 1λ) → (pkW, skD): Based on the security parameter λ, the randomized key
generation algorithm generates a public key that encodes the target function f , which is used
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by the Server to compute f . It also computes a matching secret key, which is kept private by
the Client.
2. VC.ProbGenskD(x) → (qx, sx): The problem generation algorithm uses the secret key skD
to encode the function input x as a public query qx which is given to the Server to compute
with, and a secret value sx which is kept private by the Client.
3. VC.ComputepkW(qx) → ax: Using the Client’s public key and the encoded input, the Server
computes an encoded version of the function’s output y = F (x).
4. VC.VerifyskD(sx, ax)→ y ∪{⊥}: Using the secret key skD and the secret “decoding” sx, the
verification algorithm converts the worker’s encoded output into the output of the function,
e.g., y = f(x) or outputs ⊥ indicating that ax does not represent the valid output of f on x.
The scheme should be complete, i.e. an honest Server should (almost) always return the correct
value.
Definition 4.1.12 (Completeness). A delegation scheme VC = (VC.KeyGen,VC.ProbGen,VC.Compute,VC.Verify)
has overwhelming completeness for a class of functions C if there is a function ν(n) = neg(λ) such
that for infinitely many values of λ, if fλ ∈ F ∈ C, then for all inputs x the following holds with
probability at least 1− ν(n): (pkW, skD)← VC.KeyGen(fλ, λ) (qx, sx)← VC.ProbGenskD(x) and
ax ← VC.ComputepkW(qx) then y = fλ(x)← VC.VerifyskD(sx, ax).
To define soundness we consider an adversary who plays the role of a malicious Server who
tries to convince the Client of an incorrect output y 6= f(x). The adversary is allowed to run the
protocol on inputs of her choice, i.e. see the queries qxi for adversarially chosen xi’s before picking
an input x and attempt to cheat on that input. Because we are interested in the parallel complexity
of the adversary we distinguish between two parameters l and m. The adversary is allowed to do l
rounds of adaptive queries, and in each round she queries m inputs. Jumping ahead, because our
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adversaries are restricted to NC1 circuits, we will have to bound l with a constant, but we will be
able to keep m polynomially large.
Experiment ExpVerifA [VC, f, λ, l,m]
(pkW, skD)← VC.KeyGen(f, λ);
I ← ∅;
For i = 1, . . . , i = l;
{x(i−1)m, . . . xim−1} ← Aλ(pkW, I);
{(qj, sj) : (qj, sj)← VC.ProbGenskD(xj), j ∈ {(i− 1)m, . . . , im}}
I ← I ∪ {x(i−1)m, . . . xim−1} ∪ {q(i−1)m, . . . qim−1};
aˆ← Aλ(pkW, I);
yˆ ← VC.VerifyskD(slm, aˆ)
If yˆ 6= ⊥ and yˆ 6= f(xlm), output 1, else 0.
Remark 8. In the experiment above the adversary ”tries to cheat” on the last input presented in the
last round of queries (i.e. xlm). This is without loss of generality. In fact, assume the adversary
aimed at cheating on an input presented before round l, then with one additional round it could
present that same input once more as the last of the batch in that round.
Definition 4.1.13 (Soundness). We say that a verifiable computation scheme is (l,m)-sound against
a class A of adversaries if there exists a negligible function neg(λ), such that for all A = {Aλ}λ ∈
A, and for infinitely many λ we have that
Pr[ExpVerifA [VC, f, λ, l,m] = 1] ≤ neg(λ)
Assume the function f we are trying to compute belongs to a class C which is smaller than
A. Then our definition guarantees that the ”cost” of cheating is higher than the cost of honestly
computing f and engaging in the Verifiable Computation protocol VC. Jumping ahead, our scheme
will allow us to compute the class C = AC0[2] against the class of adversaries A = NC1.
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EFFICIENCY The last thing to consider is the efficiency of a VC protocol. Here we focus on the
time complexity of computing the function f . Let n be the number of input bits, and m be the
number of output bits, and S be the size of the circuit computing f .
• A verifiable computation scheme VC is client-efficient if circuit sizes of VC.ProbGen and
VC.Verify are o(S). We say that it is linear-client if those sizes are O(poly(λ)(n+m)).
• A verifiable computation scheme VC is server-efficient if the circuit size of VC.Compute is
O(poly(λ)S).
We note that the key generation protocol VC.KeyGen can be expensive, and indeed in our protocol
(as in [23, 16, 2]) its cost is the same as computing f – this is OK as VC.KeyGen is only invoked
once per function, and the cost can be amortized over several computations of f .
4.2 Fine-Grained SHE
We start by recalling the public key encryption from [20] which is secure against adversaries in
NC1.
The scheme is described in Figure 4.1. Its security relies on the following result, implicit in
[38]3. We will also use this lemma when proving the security of our construction in Section 4.2.
Lemma 4.2.1 ([38]). If NC1 ( ⊕L/poly then there exist distribution Dkgλ over {0, 1}λ×λ, distribu-
tion Dfλ over matrices in {0, 1}λ×λ of full rank, and infinite set Λ ⊆ N such that
Mkg ∼Λ Mf
where Mf ← Dfλ and Mkg ← Dkgλ .
The following result is central to the correctness of the scheme PKE in Figure 4.1 and is implicit
in [20].
3Stated as Lemma 4.3 in [20].
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• PKE.Keygensk(1λ) :
1. Sample (M,k)← KSample(1λ);
2. Output (pk = M, sk = k).
• PKE.Encpk=M(µ)) :
1. Sample r←$ {0, 1}λ;
2. Let tᵀ = (0 . . . 0 1) ∈ {0, 1}λ;
3. Output cᵀ = rᵀM+ µtᵀ.
• PKE.Decsk=k(c) :
1. Output 〈k , c〉
Figure 4.1: PKE construction [20]
Lemma 4.2.2 ([20]). There exists sampling algorithmKSample such that (M,k)← KSample(1λ),
M is a matrix distributed according to Dkgλ (as in Lemma 4.2.1), k is a vector in the kernel of M
and has the form
k = (r1, r2, . . . , rλ−1, 1) ∈ {0, 1}λ where ri-s are uniformly distributed bits.
Theorem 4.2.3 ([20]). AssumeNC1 ( ⊕L/poly. Then, the scheme PKE = (PKE.Keygen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec)
defined in Figure 4.1 is a Public Key Encryption scheme secure against NC1 adversaries. All algo-
rithms in the scheme are computable in AC0[2].
4.2.1 Leveled Homomorphic Encryption forAC0CM[2] Functions Secure against
NC1
We denote by x[i] the i-th bit of a vector of bits x . Below, the scheme PKE = (PKE.Keygen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec)
is the one defined in Figure 4.1.
Our SHE scheme is defined by the following four algorithms:
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• HE.Keygensk(1λ, L) : For key generation, sample L+ 1 key pairs (M0,k0), . . . ,M0,kL)←
PKE.Keygen(1λ), and compute, for all ` ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}, i, j ∈ [λ], the value
a`,i,j ← PKE.EncM`+1(k`[i] · k`[j]) ∈ {0, 1}λ
We define A := {a`,i,j}`,i,j to be the set of all these values. t then outputs the secret key
sk = kL, and the public key pk = (M0,A). In the following we call evk = A the evaluation
key.
We point out a property that will be useful later: by the definition above, for all ` ∈
{0, . . . , L− 1} we have
〈k`+1 , a`+1,i,j〉 = k`[i] · k`[j] . (4.1)
• HE.Encpk(µ)) : Recall that pk = M0. To encrypt a message µwe compute v← PKE.EncM0(µ).
The output ciphertext contains v in addition to a “level tag”, an index in {0, . . . , L} denot-
ing the “multiplicative depth” of the generated ciphertext. The encryption algorithm outputs
c := (v, 0).
• HE.DeckL(c) : To decrypt a ciphertext4 c = (v, L) compute PKE.DeckL(v), i.e.
〈kL ,v〉
• HE.Evalevk(f, c1, . . . , ct) : where F : {0, 1}t → {0, 1}: We require that f is represented as an
arithmetic circuit in GF(2) with addition gates of unbounded fan-in and multiplication gates
of fan-in 2. We also require the circuit to be layered, i.e. the set of gates can be partitioned
in subsets (layers) such that wires are always between adjacent layers. Each layer should be
4We are only requiring to decrypt ciphertexts that are output by HE.Eval(· · · )
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composed homogeneously either of addition or multiplication gates. Finally, we require that
the number of multiplications layers (i.e. the multiplicative depth) of f is L.
We homomorphically evaluate f gate by gate. We will show how to perform multiplication
(resp. addition) of two (resp. many) ciphertexts. Carrying out this procedure recursively, we
can homomorphically compute any circuit f of multiplicative depth L.
Ciphertext structure during evaluation.
During the homomorphic evaluation a ciphertext will be of the form c = (v, `) where ` is the
“level tag” mentioned above. At any point of the evaluation we will have that ` is between 0
(for fresh ciphertexts at the input layer) and L (at the output layer). We define homomorphic
evaluation only among ciphertexts at the same level. Since our circuit is layered we will not
have to worry about homomorphic evaluation occurring among ciphertexts at different levels.
Consistently with the fact a level tag represents the multiplicative depth of a ciphertext,
addition gates will keep the level of ciphertexts unchanged, whereas multiplication gates will
increase it by one. Finally, we will keep the invariant that the output of each gate evaluation
c = (v, `) is such that
〈k` ,v〉 = µ (4.2)
where µ is the correct plaintext output of the gate.
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Homomorphic Evaluation of gates:
– Addition gates. Homomorphic evaluation of an addition gates on inputs c1, . . . , ct
where ci = (vi, `) is performed by outputting
cadd = (vadd, `) :=
(∑
i
vi, `
)
Informally, one can see that
〈k` ,vadd〉 = 〈k` ,
∑
i
vi〉 =
∑
i
〈k` ,vi〉 =
∑
i
µi
where µi is the plaintext corresponding to vi. This satisfies the invariant in Eq. 4.2.
– Multiplication gates. We show how to multiply ciphertexts c, c′ where c = (v, `) and
c′ = (v′, `) to obtain an output ciphertext cmult = (vmult, `+ 1).
The homomorphic multiplication algorithm will set
vmult :=
∑
i,j∈[λ]
hi,j · a`+1,i,j
where hi,j = v[i] · v′[j] for i, j ∈ [λ].
The final output ciphertext will be
cmult := (vmult, `+ 1).
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This satisfies the invariant in Eq. 4.2 as
〈k`+1 ,vmult〉 = 〈k`+1 ,
∑
i,j∈[λ]
hi,j · a`+1,i,j〉
=
∑
i,j∈[λ]
(hi,j · 〈k`+1 , a`+1,i,j〉)
=
∑
i,j∈[λ]
(hi,j · k`[i] · k`[j])
=
∑
i,j∈[λ]
(v[i] · v′[j] · k`[i] · k`[j])
=
(∑
i∈[λ]
v[i] · k`[i]
)
·
(∑
j∈[λ]
v′[j] · k`[j]
)
= 〈k` ,v〉 · 〈k` ,v′〉
= µ · µ′
where in the third and fourth equality we used respectively Eq. 4.1 and the definition
of hi,j , and µ, µ′ are the plaintexts corresponding to v v′ respectively.
4.2.2 Security Analysis
Theorem 4.2.4 (Security). The scheme HE is CPA secure against NC1 adversaries (Definition
4.1.7) under the assumption NC1 ( ⊕L/poly.
Proof. We are going to prove that there exists infinite Λ ⊆ N such that (pk, evk,HE.Encpk(0)) ∼Λ
(pk, evk,HE.Encpk(1)).
When using the notations Mf and Mkg we will always denote matrices distributed respectively
according to Dfλ and Dkg, where Dfλ and Dkg are the distributions defined in Lemma 4.2.1.
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We will define the (randomized) encoding procedure E : {0, 1}λ×λ → {0, 1}λ defined as
E(M, b) = rᵀM+ (0 . . . 0 b)ᵀ ,
where r is uniformly distributed in {0, 1}λ. The functions we will pass to E will be distributed
either according to Mkg or Mf . Notice that: (i) E(Mkg, b) is distributed identically to HE.Encpk(b);
(ii) E(Mf , b) corresponds to the uniform distribution over {0, 1}λ because (by Lemma 4.2.1) Mf
has full rank and hence rᵀMf must be uniformly random.
We will denote with Mkg1 , . . . ,M
kg
L the matrices M1, . . . ,M` used to construct the evaluation
key in HE.Keygen (see definition). Recall these matrices are distributed according to Dkg as in
Lemma 4.2.1.
We will also define the following vectors:
αkg` := {E(Mkg`+1,k`[i] · k`[j]) | i, j ∈ [λ]} αf` := {E(Mf`+1,k`[i] · k`[j]) | i, j ∈ [λ]} ,
where k` is defined as in HE.Keygen and the matrices in input to E will be clear from the context.
Notice that all the elements of αkg` are encryptions, whereas all the elements of α
f
` are uniformly
distributed.
We will use a standard hybrid argument. Each of our hybrids is parametrized by a bit b. This
bit informally marks whether the hybrid contains an element indistinguishable from an encryption
of b.
• Eb := (Mkg0 ,E(Mkg0 , b),αkg1 , . . . ,αkgL ) whereMkg0 corresponds to the public key of our scheme.
Notice that αkg` ≡ {a`,i,j | i, j ∈ [λ]} where a`,i,j is as defined in HE.Keygen. This hybrid
corresponds to the distribution (pk, evk,HE.Encpk(b)).
• Hb0 := (Mf0,E(Mf , b),αkg1 , . . . ,αkgL ). The only difference from E is in the first two com-
ponents where we replaced the actual public key and ciphertext with a full rank matrix dis-
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tributed according to Dfλ and a random vector of bits.
• For ` ∈ [L] we define
Hb` := (Mf0,E(Mf , b),αf1, . . . ,αf`,αkg`+1, . . . ,αkgL ) .
We will proceed proving that
E0 ∼Λ H00 ∼Λ H01 ∼Λ . . . ∼Λ H0L ∼Λ H1L ∼Λ . . . ∼Λ H11 ∼Λ H10 ∼Λ E1
through a series of smaller claims. In the remainder of the proof Λ refers to the set in Lemma 4.2.1.
• E0 ∼Λ H00: if this were not the case we would be able to distinguish Mkg0 from Mf0 for some
of the values in the set Λ thus contradicting Lemma 4.2.1.
• H0`−1 ∼Λ H0` for ` ∈ [L]: assume by contradiction this statement is false for some ` ∈ [L].
That is
(Mf0,E(M
f
0, b),α
f
1, . . . ,α
f
`−1,α
kg
` , . . . ,α
kg
L ) 6∼Λ (Mf0,E(Mf0, b),αf1, . . . ,αf`,αkg`+1, . . . ,αkgL ) .
Recall that, by definition, the elements of αkg` are all encryptions whereas the elements of α
f
`
are all randomly distributed values. This contradicts the the semantic security of the scheme
PKE (by a standard hybrid argument on the number of ciphertexts).
• H0L ∼Λ H1L: the distributions associated to these two hybrids are identical. In fact, notice
the only difference between these two hybrids is in the second component: E(Mf , 0) in H0L
and E(Mf , 1) inH1L. As observed above E(Mf , b) is uniformly distributed, which proves the
claim.
All the claims above can be proven analogously for E1,H10 andH1` -s.
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4.2.3 Efficiency and Homomorphic Properties of Our Scheme
Our scheme is secure against adversaries in the class NC1. This implies that we can run HE.Eval
only on functions f that are in NC1, otherwise the evaluator would be able to break the semantic
security of the scheme. However we have to ensure that the whole homomorphic evaluation stays
in NC1. The problem is that homomorphically evaluating f has an overhead with respect to the
”plain” evaluation of f . Therefore, we need to determine for which functions f , we can guarantee
that HE.Eval(F, . . . ) will stay in NC1.
In terms of circuit depth, the main overhead when evaluating f homomorphically is given by
the multiplication gates (addition, on the other hand, is “for free” — see definition of HE.Eval
above). A single homomorphic multiplication can be performed by a depth two AC0[2] circuit,
but this requires depth Ω(log(n)) with a circuit of fan-in two. Therefore, a circuit for f with ω(1)
multiplicative depth would require an evaluation of ω(log(n)) depth, which would be out of NC1.
On the other hand, observe that for any function f in AC0[2] with constant multiplicative depth,
the evaluation stays in AC0[2]. This because there is a constant number (depth) of homomorphic
multiplications each requiring an AC0[2] computation.
We can now state the following result, derived from the observations above and the fact that
the invariant in Eq. 4.2 is preserved throughout homomorphic evaluation.
Theorem 4.2.5. Let AC0CM[2] the family of circuits in AC
0[2] with constant multiplicative depth
(see Definition 4.1.3). The scheme HE is leveled AC0CM[2]-homomorphic. Key generation, encryp-
tion, decryption and evaluation are all computable in AC0CM[2].
4.2.4 Beyond Constant Multiplicative Depth
In the previous section we saw how our scheme is homomorphic for a class of constant-depth,
unbounded fan-in arithmetic circuits in GF(2) with constant multiplicative depth, i.e. polynomials
in GF(2) of constant degree. We now show how to overcome this limitation by slightly chang-
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ing our scheme and using techniques from [49] to approximate AC0[2] circuits with low-degree
polynomials.
Lemma 4.2.6 ([49]). Let C be an AC0Q[2] circuit of depth d. Then there exists a randomized circuit
C ′ ∈ AC0CM[2] such that, for all x,
Pr[C ′(x) 6= C(x)] ≤  ,
where  = O(1). The circuit C ′ uses O(n) random bits and its representation can be computed in
NC0 from a representation of C.
Proof. Consider a circuit C ∈ AC0Q[2] and let K = O(1) be the total number of AND and OR gates
with non-constant fan-in. We can replace every OR gate of fan-in m = ω(1) with a randomized
“gadget” that takes in input m additional random bits and computes the function
gˆOR(x1, . . . , xm; r1, . . . , rm) :=
∑
i∈[m]
xiri .
This function can be implemented in constant multiplicative depth with one XOR gate and m AND
gates of fan-in two. Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) and r = (r1, . . . , rm). The probabilistic gadget gˆOR
has one-sided error. if xi = 0 (i.e. if OR(x) = 0) then Pr[gˆOR(x; r) = 0] = 1; otherwise
Pr[gˆOR(x; r) = 1] =
1
2
.
In a similar fashion, we can replace every unbounded fan-in AND gate with a randomized
gadget in computing
gˆAND(x1, . . . , xm; r1, . . . , rm) := 1−
∑
i∈[m]
(1− xi)ri .
This gadget can also be implemented in constant-multiplicative depth and has one-sided error 1/2.
Finally, let us observe that Pr[C ′(x) 6= C(x)] ≤  with  being a constant, because we have only a
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constant number of gates to be replaced with gadgets for gˆOR or gˆAND.
We only provide the intuition for why the transformations above can be carried out in NC0.
Assume the encoding of a circuit as a list of gates in the form (g, tg, in1, . . . , inm) where g and t
are respectively the index of the output wire of the gate and its type (possibly of the form “input”
or “random input”) and the ini-s are the indices of the input wire of g. The transformation from
C to C ′ needs to simply copy all the items in the list except for the gates of unbounded fan-in.
We will assume the encoding conventions of C always puts these gates at the end of the list5. For
each of such gates the transformation circuit needs to: add appropriate r1, . . . , rm to the list, add m
AND gates and one XOR, possibly (if we are transforming an AND gate) add negation gates. All
this can be carried out based on wire connections and the type of the gate (a constant-size string)
and thus in NC0.
In the construction above, we built C ′ by replacing every gate g ∈ Sω(1)(C) (as in Definition
4.1.4) with a (randomized) gadget Gg. The output of each these gadgets will be useful in order to
keep the low complexity of the decryption algorithm in our next homomorphic encryption scheme.
We shall use an “expanded” version of C ′, the multi-output circuit C ′exp.
Definition 4.2.7 (Expanded Approximating Function). Let C be a circuit in AC0Q[2] and let C ′
be a circuit as in the proof of Lemma 4.2.6. We denote by Gg(x; r) the output of the gadget Gg
when C ′ is evaluated on inputs (x; r). On input (x; r), the multi-output circuit C ′exp output C
′(x; r)
together with the outputs of the O(1) gadgets Gg for each g ∈ Sω(1)(C). Finally, we denote with
GenApproxFun the algorithm computeing a representation of C ′exp from a representation of C.
Lemma 4.2.8. There exists a deterministic algorithm DecodeApprox computable in AC0[2] with
the following properties. For every circuit C in AC0Q[2] computing the function f , there exists
5This allows our NC0 circuit to to “know” which gates to copy and which ones to transform based on their position
only.
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auxf ∈ {0, 1}O(1) such that for all x ∈ {0, 1}n
Pr[DecodeApprox(C ′exp(x; r
(1)), . . . , C ′exp(x; r
(s))) = C(x)] ≥ 1− neg(s) ,
where C ′ is an approximating circuit as in Lemma 4.2.6, the probability is taken over the uniformly
distributed bit vectors r(i)-s for i ∈ [s], C ′exp is as in Definition 4.2.7. Finally, there exists a function
GenDecodeAux that computes auxf from a representation of C in NC0.
Proof. Before we provide a construction for DecodeApprox, let us observe how we can am-
plify the error of C ′. Consider for example a gadget gˆOR constructed as in the proof of Lemma
4.2.6, approximating an OR gate in C. If we repeat the execution of the gadget s times, every
time using fresh random bit vectors r′(1), . . . , r′(s), then we can correctly compute OR(x′) with
overwhelming probability. Define hOR(x′; r′(1), . . . , r′(s)) := OR(gˆOR(x; r′(1)), . . . , gˆOR(x′; r′(s))).
Clearly Pr[hOR(x′; r′(1), . . . , r′(s)) = OR(x′)] ≥ 1 − 2−s. In a similar fashion we can define
hAND(x
′; r′(1), . . . , r′(s)) := AND(gˆAND(x; r′(1)), . . . , gˆAND(x′; r′(s))). It holds that Pr[hAND(x′; r′(1), . . . , r′(s)) =
AND(x′)] ≥ 1− 2−s.
IfC ′ were composed by a single gadget gˆOR (resp. gˆAND) we could just let DecodeApprox be the
same as hOR (resp. hAND) and we would be done. To deal with multiple gadgets, however, we need
a more general approach. For sake of presentation, assume there are only gadgets approximating
OR gates and let us temporarily ignore auxf . We can write each of the C ′exp(x; r
(j)) input to
DecodeApprox as (z(j), y(j)1 , . . . , y
(j)
K ) where K := |Sω(1)|, z(j) is the output of C ′(x, r(j)) and
y
(j)
i is the output of the i − th gadget when provided random bits from r(j). Define y∗i as y∗i :=
OR(y
(1)
i , . . . , y
(s)
i ). We then let the output of DecodeApprox be z
j∗ where j∗ is such that for all
i ∈ [K] it is the case that yj∗i = y∗i . By the union bound the probability of zj∗ 6= C(x) is upper
bounded by K · 2−s, which is negligible since K = O(1). To generalize this same approach to
the scenario including both OR and AND gadgets we let the string auxf include information on
the type of gates in Sω(1). This way DecodeApprox can use gˆOR or gˆAND accordingly. Clearly the
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representation of auxf can be computed by a representation of C in NC0.
Homomorphic Evaluations of AC0Q[2] Circuits
Below is a variation of our homomorphic scheme that can evaluate all circuits in AC0Q[2] in AC
0[2].
This time, in order to evaluate circuit C, we perform several homomorphic evaluations of the
randomized circuit C ′ (as in Lemma 4.2.6). To obtain the plaintext output of C we can decrypt
all the ciphertext outputs and take the majority result. Notice that this scheme is still compact. As
we use a randomized approach to evaluate f , the scheme HE′ will be implicitly parametrized by a
soundness parameter s. Intuitively, the probability of a function f being evaluated incorrectly will
be upper bounded by 2−s.
For our new scheme we will use the following auxiliary functions:
Definition 4.2.9 (Auxiliary Functions for HE′).
Let f : {0, 1}t → {0, 1} be represented as an arithmetic circuit as in HE and pk a public key for
the scheme HE that includes the evaluation key. Let s be a soundness parameter. We denote by
f ′ the expanded randomized function approximating f as in Definition 4.2.7; let t′ = O(t) be the
number of additional random bits f ′ will take in input.
• GenApproxFun(f) :
– Computes and returns the representation of the expanded approximating function f ′ as
in Definition 4.2.7.
• GenDecodeAux(f) :
– Computes and returns the auxiliary string auxf from a representation of f as in Lemma
4.2.8.
• SampleAuxRandomnesss(pk, f ′) :
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1. We assume f ′ is the expanded randomized function approximating f as in Definition
4.2.7; let t′ = O(t) be the number of additional random bits f ′ will take in input.
2. Sample s · t′ random bits r(1)1 , . . . , r(1)t′ , . . . , r(s)1 , . . . , r(s)t′ ;
3. Compute rˆaux := {rˆ(i)j | rˆ(i)j ← HE.Encpk(r(i)j ), i ∈ [s], j ∈ [t′]};
4. Output rˆaux.
• EvalApproxs(pk, f ′, c1, . . . , ct, rˆaux) :
1. Let rˆaux = {rˆ(i)j | i ∈ [s], j ∈ [t′]}.
2. For i ∈ [s], compute couti ← HE.Evalevk(f ′, c1, . . . ct, rˆ(i)1 , . . . , rˆ(i)t′ );
3. Output c = (cout1 , . . . , c
out
s )
6.
The new scheme HE′ with soundness parameter s follows. Notice that the evaluation function
outputs an auxiliary string auxf together with the proper ciphertext c. This is necessary to have a
correct decoding in decryption phase.
• Key generation and encryption are the same as in HE.
• HE′.Evalpk(f, c1, . . . , ct):
1. Compute f ′ ← GenApproxFun(f);
2. Compute rˆaux ← SampleAuxRandomnesss(pk, f ′);
3. auxf ← GenDecodeAux(f);
4. c← EvalApproxs(pk, f ′, c1, . . . , ct, rˆaux);
6Recall that the output of the expanded approximating function f ′ is a bit string and thus each couti encrypts a bit
string.
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5. Output (c, auxf ).
• HE′.Decsk(c = (cout1 , . . . , couts ), auxf ):
1. Let youti ← HE.Decsk(couti ) for i ∈ [s];
2. Output DecodeApproxf (yout1 , . . . ,y
out
s ).
Remark 9. Given in input a function f not necessarily of constant multiplicative depth, GenApproxFun
returns a function f ′ of constant multiplicative depth that approximates it. As stated in Lemma
4.2.6, GenApproxFun is computable inNC0 and so isGenDecodeAux. The function SampleAuxRandomness
in AC0CM[2] and EvalApprox makes parallel invocations to HE.Eval which is computable in AC
0
CM[2]
when provided in input a function in AC0CM[2] (Theorem 4.2.5). This fact will be useful when
showing the completeness of our verifiable computation schemes in Section 4.3.
Theorem 4.2.10. Let AC0Q[2] the family of circuits in AC
0[2] with quasi-constant multiplicative
depth as in Definition 4.1.4. The scheme HE′ above with soundness parameter s = Ω(λ) is leveled
AC0Q[2]-homomorphic. Key generation, encryption and evaluation can be computed in AC
0
CM[2].
Decryption is computable in AC0[2].
4.3 Fine-Grained Verifiable Computation
In this section we describe our private verifiable computation scheme. Our constructions are heav-
ily based on the techniques in [16] to obtain (reusable) verifiable computation from fully homo-
morphic encryption. In order to guarantee that these techniques also work within NC1 we prove
that: (i) the constructions can be computed in low-depth; (ii) the reductions in the security proofs
can be carried out in low-depth.
THE SCHEME FROM [16]. To derive Verifiable Computation from Homomorphic Encryption,
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[16] follows this approach. The Client, in the expensive preprocessing phase, selects a random
input r, encrypts it cr = E(r) and homomorphically compute cf(r) an encryption of f(r). During
the online phase, the Client, on input x, computes cx = E(x) and submits the ciphertexts cx, cr in
random order to the Server, who homomorphically compute cf(r) = E(f(r)) and cf(x) = E(f(x))
and returns them to the Client. The Client given the message c0, c1 from the Server, checks that
cb = cf(r) (for the appropriate bit b) and if so accepts y = D(cf(x)) as y = f(x). The semantic
security of E guarantees that this protocol has soundness error 1/2 (which can be reduced by
parallel repetition). This scheme is however one-time, as a malicious server can figure out which
one is the test ciphertext cf(r) if it is used again.
To make this scheme “many time secure”, [16] uses the paradigm introduced in [23] of running
the one-time scheme “under the covers” of a different homomorphic encryption key each time.
4.3.1 A One-time Verification Scheme
Before we present our variant of the one-time construction in [16], we present two auxiliary lem-
mas that guarantee that our protocols are computable in AC0[2]. We refer the reader to [33, 45] for
the proof Lemma 4.3.1.
Lemma 4.3.1. [33, 45] There are uniform AC0 circuits C : {0, 1}poly(l) → [l]l of size poly(l) and
depth O(1) whose output distribution have statistical distance ≤ 2−l from the uniform distribution
over permutations of [l].
Lemma 4.3.2. There are uniform AC0[2] circuits C : [l]l × {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l of size O(l2) where
C(pi, (x1, . . . , xl)) = (pi(1), . . . , pi(l)) and pi is a permutation.
Proof. Let x = (x1, . . . , xl) the bits to permute and let pi be a permutation If pi is represented as a
permutation matrix with rows r1, . . . , rl, we can permute x by simply performing l parallel inner
products 〈x , ri〉-s, which is in AC0[2]. We now describe how to generate the permutation matrix
from a binary representations x1, . . . , xlg(l) of the integers in [l]. Let fi : {0, 1}lg(l) → {0, 1}l be
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the function that computes the i-th row of the permutation matrix. We can define fi as follows:
fi(x1, . . . , xlg(l)) := eq([i− 1]2, (x1, . . . , xlg(l)) ,
where [i− 1]2 is the binary representation of i− 1 and eq returns 1 if its two inputs (each of lenght
lg(l)) are equal. The function fi is clearly in AC0[2].
In Figure 4.2 we describe an adaptation of the one-time secure delegation scheme from [16].
We make non-black box use of our homomorphic encryption scheme HE′ (Section 4.2.4) with
soundness parameter s = λ. Notice that. during the preprocessing phase, we fix the “auxiliary
randomness” for EvalApprox (and thus for HE′.Eval) once and for all. We will use that same
randomness for all the input instances. This choice does not affect the security of the construction.
We remind the reader that we will simplify notation by considering the evaluation key of our
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme as part of its public key.
If x is a vector of bits x1, . . . , xn, below we will denote with HE′.Enc(x) the concatenation of
the bit by bit ciphertexts HE′.Enc(x1), . . . ,HE′.Enc(xn). We denote by HE′.Enc(0¯) the concatena-
tion of n encryptions of 0, HE′.Enc(0).
Remark 10 (On deterministic homomorphic evaluation). As pointed out in [16], one requirement
for the approach in Figure 4.2 to work is for the homomorphic evaluation to be deterministic. We
point out that once rˆaux are fixed once and for all the homomorphic evaluation in VC.Compute is
deterministic.
Lemma 4.3.3 (Completeness of VC). The verifiable computation scheme VC in Figure 4.2 has
overwhelming completeness (Definition 4.1.12) for the class AC0Q[2].
Proof. The proof is straightforward and stems directly from the homomorphic properties of HE′
(Theorem 4.2.10). In fact, by construction and by definition of HE′ (Section 4.2.4), the distribution
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Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a function and GenApproxFun, SampleAuxRandomness and
EvalApprox as in Definition 4.2.9.
• VC.KeyGen(1λ, f)→ (pkW, skD): We assume function f represented as
1. Generate a pair of keys (pk, sk)← HE′.Keygen(1λ).
2. Generate the approximating function f ′ ← GenApproxFun(f) and auxiliary string
auxf ← GenDecodeAux(f);
3. Generate the ciphertext of the auxiliary random input for homomorphic evaluation
rˆaux ← SampleAuxRandomnessλ(pk, f ′)
4. Compute t independent encryptions rˆi = HE′.Encpk(0¯) and the homomorphic eval-
uations wˆi = fˆ(rˆi) = EvalApproxs(pk, f ′, rˆi, rˆaux) for i ∈ [t];
5. pkW ← (pk, f ′, rˆaux), skD ← ({(rˆi, wˆi)i∈[t]}, auxf ).
• VC.ProbGenskD(x)→ (qx, sx):
1. Compute t independent encryptions rˆi+t = HE′.Encpk(x) for i ∈ [t].
2. Sample a random permutation pi←$S2t.
3. qx ← (zˆpi(1), . . . , zˆpi(2t)) = (rˆ1, . . . , rˆ2t); sx ← pi
• VC.ComputepkW(qx)→ ax:
1. Compute yˆi = fˆ(zˆi) = EvalApproxs(pk, f ′, zˆi, rˆaux) for i ∈ [2t].
2. ax = (yˆ1, . . . , yˆ2t).
• VC.VerifyskD(sx, ax):
1. Check if wˆi = yˆi for all i ∈ [t].
2. Check if HE′.Decsk(yˆpi(t+1), auxf ) = · · · = HE′.Decsk(yˆpi(2t), auxf ).
3. If either of the two tests above fails, return ⊥; otherwise return
HE′.Decsk(yˆpi(t+1), auxf ).
Figure 4.2: One-Time Delegation Scheme
CHAPTER 4. FINE-GRAINED VERIFIABLE COMPUTATION 88
of the wˆi-s is identical to HE′.Evalpk(f, rˆi). Analogously, the distribution of yˆi-s is identical to
HE′.Evalpk(f, zˆi).
Remark 11 (Efficiency of VC). In the following we consider the verifiable computation of a func-
tion f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m computable by an AC0Q[2] circuit of size S.
• VC.KeyGen can be computed by an AC0[2] circuit of size O(poly(λ)S);
• VC.ProbGen can be computed by an AC0[2] circuit of size O(poly(λ)(m+ n));
• VC.Compute can be computed by an AC0[2] circuit of size O(poly(λ)S);
• VC.Verify can be computed by a AC0[2] circuit of size O(poly(λ)(m + n)) and whose (con-
stant) depth is independent of the depth of f .
Lemma 4.3.4 (One-time Soundness). Under the assumption that NC1 ( ⊕L/poly the scheme in
Figure 4.2 is (1, 1)-sound (one time secure) against NC1 adversaries whenever t is chosen to be
ω(log(λ)).
Proof. We follow the same proof structure as in the proof of Lemma 12 in [16]. We will keep part
of the analysis informal, emphasizing why this proof still works for low-depth circuits. We refer
the reader to [16] for further details.
The following observation will be crucial in the rest of the proof. Notice that, by construction
and by definition of HE′ (Section 4.2.4), the distribution of the wˆi-s is identical to HE′.Evalpk(f, rˆi).
Analogously, the distribution of yˆi-s is identical to HE′.Evalpk(f, zˆi).
Consider an NC1 adversary A∗ that cheats with non-negligible probability in the one-time
security experiment ExpVerifA [VC, f, λ, 1, 1] (Definition 4.1.13). Let (rˆ1, . . . , rˆt) be the indepen-
dent copies of HE′.EncpkW(0¯) and (rˆt+1, . . . , rˆ2t) the t independent copies of HE
′.EncpkW(x) as
above. Whenever the verification algorithm accepts, the adversary must have responded correctly
on rˆ1, ..., rˆt and incorrectly (and consistently) on rˆt+1, . . . , rˆ2t. Our goal is to bound the probability
that the adversary succeeds in doing that.
CHAPTER 4. FINE-GRAINED VERIFIABLE COMPUTATION 89
First, notice that the view of the adversary is (pkW, rˆ1, . . . , rˆ2t), and identical to
(pkW,HE
′.EncpkW(0¯)
t,HE′.EncpkW(x)
t). By semantic security of the homomorphic encryption
scheme, there exists an infinitely large set of parameters Λ such that
(pkW,HE
′.EncpkW(0¯)
t,HE′.EncpkW(x)
t) ∼Λ (pkW,HE′.EncpkW(0¯)2t)
Consider a modified game where the adversary receives (pkW,HE′.EncpkW(0¯)
2t). Denote by p the
probability that the adversary succeeds in this game. By computational indistinguishability we
have
Pr[A∗ is correct on (rˆ1, . . . , rˆt) and incorrect on (rˆt+1, . . . , rˆ2t)] ≤ p+ neg(λ)
for all λ ∈ Λ. This inequality holds because we can test in NC1 whether A∗ cheats only on
(rˆt+1, . . . , rˆ2t). Therefore, if the adversary’s behavior differed significantly between the two games,
one would be able to break the semantic security of the homomorphic scheme. Here we made use
of the third fact in Lemma 4.1.6.
We now proceed to upper bound p. Observe that
p = Pr[A∗ is correct on (zˆpi(1), . . . , zˆpi(t)) and incorrect on (zˆpi(t+1), . . . , zˆpi(2t))]
where the zˆpi(i)-s are defined as in Figure 4.2. Because of Lemma 4.3.1 that the distribution of pi is
statistically indistinguishable from that of a uniformly random permutation. Also, observe that the
answers yˆi of the adversary are independent of pi. We can then conclude that p ≤ 1(2tt ) + neg(t),
which concludes the security analysis.
4.3.2 A Reusable Verification Scheme
We now describe how to obtain a reusable verification scheme VC applying the transformation in
[16] from one-time sound verification schemes through fully homomorphic encryption. The core
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Let VC be the verifiable computation scheme defined in Figure 4.2. The reusable verifiable
computation scheme VC = (VC.KeyGen,VC.ProbGen,VC.Compute,VC.Verify) is defined as
follows.
• VC.KeyGen(1λ, f)→ (pkW, skD): The key generation stage is the same as in VC.
• VC.ProbGenskD(x)→ (qx, sx):
1. (qx, sx)← VC.ProbGenskD(x);
2. Compute a fresh pair of keys (pkx, skx)← HE.Keygen(1λ);
3. Compute qˆx ← HE.Encpkx(qx);
4. qx ← (pkx, qˆx); sx ← (sx, skx)
• VC.ComputepkW(qx)→ ax:
1. aˆx ← HE.Evalpkx(VC.Compute(·, f), qˆx).
2. ax ← aˆx.
• VC.VerifyskD(sx, ax):
1. ax ← HE.Decskx(aˆx).
2. return VC.VerifyskD(sx, ax).
Figure 4.3: Transformation from one-time VC scheme to a reusable VC scheme
idea behind the transformation in [16] is to encapsulate all the operations of a one-time verifiable
computation scheme through homomorphic encryption. We instantiate this transformation with the
one-time verifiable construction VC, described in Figure 4.2, and the simplest of our two somewhat
homomorphic encryption schemes, HE (defined in Section 4.2.1).
Corollary 4.3.5 (Completeness of VC). The verifiable computation scheme VC in Figure 4.3 has
overwhelming completeness (Definition 4.1.12) for the class AC0Q[2].
Proof. The completeness of the scheme above follows directly from the completeness of VC and
the homomorphic properties of HE. Notice that we can use HE.Eval to homomorphically compute
VC.Compute as the latter carries out a computation in AC0CM[2] (although it is approximating a
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computation in AC0Q[2]).
Remark 12 (Efficiency of VC). The efficiency of VC is analogous to that of VC with the exception
of a circuit size overhead of a factor O(λ) on the problem generation and verification algorithms
and of O(λ2) for the computation algorithm. All algorithms in VC are computable by constant
depth circuit (of unbounded fan-in) and the depth of the verification algorithm is independent of
the function F .
Theorem 4.3.6. Under the assumption that NC1 ( ⊕L/poly the scheme VC in Figure 4.3 is
(O(1), poly(λ))-sound (many-times secure) against NC1 adversaries whenever t is chosen to be
ω(log(λ)) in the underlying scheme VC.
Proof. By Lemma 4.3.4 there exists an infinite set Λ ⊆ N of security parameters for which VC
“is secure”. By the proof of Lemma 4.3.4, this set is also the set of parameters where the some-
what homomorphic encryption scheme HE “is secure”. We will show that for all values in this
same set Λ, the probability of success of any NC1 adversary in ExpVerifA [VC, f, λ,O(1), poly(λ)] is
negligible.
Assume by contradiction there exists an NC1 adversaryA∗ that achieves non-negligible advan-
tage in ExpVerifA [VC, f, λ,O(1), poly(λ)] for some λ ∈ Λ.
Claim: If VC is not secure for some λ∗ ∈ Λ then we can break the one-time security of VC.
Let l = O(1) be the number of rounds in the many-time soundness experiment for VC. Consider
the following NC1 adversary A1 for the experiment ExpVerifA [VC, f, λ, 1, 1]:
• A1 obtains a pair a public key pkW and sends it to A∗;
• For all rounds i ∈ {1, . . . , l− 1}, A1 replies toA∗ queries by generating a fresh pair of keys
(pk, sk) and sending back encryptions of HE.Encpk(0¯);
• At round l, A1 responds to all input queries but the last one as above. This, by experiment
definition, is the input whereA∗ will try to cheat; we denote this input by x∗. NowA1 sends
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x∗ as the only input query in the one-time security experiment and will receive back q∗. It
will then obtain a fresh pair of keys (pk∗, sk∗) and send HE.Encpk∗(q∗) to A∗.
• A∗ will respond with aˆ∗ and A1 will send HE.Decsk∗(aˆ) to the challenger for one-time secu-
rity experiment.
The advantage ofA1 depends on how likely isA∗ can successfully cheat in that interaction. Let
p be the advantage ofA1 in the one-time security experiment. Clearly, if p is close to the advantage
of A∗ in the many-times security experiment A1 breaks the security of the one-time scheme.
Claim: the advantage of A1 is negligibly close to that of A∗ in the many-time security
game for security parameter λ∗. We can prove this by relying on the semantic security of the
homomorphic encryption and on a hybrid argument.
Let L = lm, the total number of input queries in the many-times security experiment. We
now define the hybrids H(j) with j ∈ {0, . . . , L}. We define H(0) to be the exactly the many-time
security experiment. For j ∈ [L] we define H(j) to be an experiment where we respond to input
queries with HE.Encpkf (0¯) where pkf is a fresh public key up to input query j and behaves the
many-time security experiment from input query j + 1 on. Notice that H(L) corresponds to the
interaction with A1 above.
Denote by A(j) the output distribution of A∗ when interacting with H(j). Intuitively, if the
advantage of theA1 in the one-time experiment is significantly different from the advantage ofA∗
in the many-times security games, then A(0) and A(L) are not Λ-computationally indistinguishable.
Therefore (by Lemma 4.1.6), there exists j ∈ [L] such that A(j−1) 6∼Λ A(j).
Claim: If there exists j ∈ [L] such that A(j−1) 6∼Λ A(j) then we can break the semantic
security of HE. Consider the following NC1 adversaryACPA which receives in input a “challenge”
public key pk∗. ACPA will interact with A∗ simulating H(j) until receiving input query xj . At this
point it will compute qj from VC.ProbGen(xj) and send to the CPA challenger (see Remark 7) qj
and 0¯, receiving back an encryption c∗ of either message under the public key pk∗. ACPA will now
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send (pk∗, c∗) to A∗ and continue simulating H(j) till the end of the experiment. The adversary
ACPA will check whether A∗ cheated successfully at the end of the experiment and output (in the
multiple-message CPA experiment) 1 if that is the case and 0 otherwise. This would allowACPA to
have a noticeable advantage in the experiment thus breaking the semantic security of HE.
Appendix A
Appendix A
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In this chapter we show that a fine-grained interactive proof yields a sequentially composable
rational proof.
Definition (Fine-Grained Interactive Proof). Let C be a complexity class. An interactive protocol
(P, V ) is a fine-grained interactive proof with respect to C if it has perfect completeness and for all
P˜ ∈ C and all inputs x
Pr[out(P˜ , V )(x) 6= f(x)] ≤ neg(|x|)
Theorem. Let (P, V ) be a fine-grained interactive proof with respect to class C for the function f .
Let c be a cost function such that for all P˜ and for all inputs x c(P˜ , x) ≤ c(f) =⇒ P˜ ∈ C, then
(P, V ) is a (neg(|x|, poly(|x|))-sequentially composable rational proof for f .
Proof. Let P˜ be a prover such that c(P˜ , x) < c(f) and such that Pr[out(P˜ , V ) 6= f(x)] = 1.
Consider the interaction between P˜ and V . And let V reward P˜ with R = poly(|x|) if V accepts
and with 0 otherwise. The probability of P˜ cheating successfully is negligible (as it must be in the
class C by hypothesis). The result follows by Corollary 3.2.3.
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